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Gonzales v. Oregon
(04-623)
Ruling Below: (Gonzales v. Oregon, 368 F.3d 1118 (9t Cir. 2004); cert granted 125 S.Ct. 1299,
161 L.Ed.2d 104, 73 USLW 3298, 73 USLW 3481, 73 USLW 3494 (Feb 22, 2005) (No. 04-
623)).
Appellees, the State of Oregon and others, challenged the Ashcroft Directive, published at 66
Fed. Reg. 56,607, because it criminalized conduct specifically authorized by Oregon's Death
with Dignity Act. The court held that the Ashcroft Directive was unlawful and unenforceable
because it violated the plain language of the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), because it
contravened Congress' express legislative intent, and overstepped the bounds of the U.S.
Attorney General's statutory authority. The court found that the CSA was enacted to combat
drug abuse. The court further found that to the extent that the CSA authorized the federal
government to make decisions regarding the practice of medicine, those decisions were
delegated to the Secretary of Health and Human Services, not to the Attorney General.
Question Presented: Whether the Attorney General has permissibly construed the Controlled
Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. 801 et seq., and its implementing regulations to prohibit the
distribution of federally controlled substances for the purpose of facilitating an individual's
suicide, regardless of a state law purporting to authorize such distribution.
State of OREGON, et. al., Plaintiff-Appellee
V.
John ASHCROFT, et. al., Defendant-Appellant
United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit
Decided May 26, 2004
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted]
TALLMAN, Circuit Judge:
A doctor, a pharmacist, several terminally ill
patients, and the State of Oregon challenge
an interpretive rule issued by Attorney
General John Ashcroft which declares that
physician assisted suicide violates the
Controlled Substances Act of 1970 ("CSA"),
21 U.S.C. §§ 801-904. This so-called
"Ashcroft Directive," criminalizes conduct
specifically authorized by Oregon's Death
With Dignity Act, Or. Rev. Stat. § 127.800-
897. We hold that the Ashcroft Directive is
unlawful and unenforceable because it
violates the plain language of the CSA,
contravenes Congress' express legislative
intent, and oversteps the bounds of the
Attorney General's statutory authority. The
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petitions for review are granted.
The Ashcroft Directive purports to interpret
and implement the CSA, which Congress
enacted as Title II of the Comprehensive
Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of
1970. The stated purpose of the CSA is "to
provide increased research into, and
prevention of, drug abuse and drug
dependence . . . and to strengthen existing
law enforcement authority in the field of
drug abuse." This legislation is designed to
deal in comprehensive fashion with the
growing menace of drug abuse in the United
States[.]").
In 1984, Congress amended the CSA to give
broader authority to the Attorney General.
The Attorney General is now authorized to
revoke a physician's prescription privileges
upon his determination that the physician
has "committed such acts as would render
his registration . . . inconsistent with the
public interest[.]" 21 U.S.C. § 824(a)(4).
When determining which acts are
inconsistent with the public interest, the
Attorney General must consider the
following factors:
(1) The recommendation of the appropriate
State licensing board or professional
disciplinary authority;
(2) The applicant's expertise in dispensing
. . controlled substances;
(3) The applicant's conviction record under
Federal or State laws relating to the
manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of
controlled substances;
(4) Compliance with applicable State,
Federal, or local laws relating to controlled
substances;
(5) Such other conduct which may threaten
the public health and safety.
Although this provision gives the Attorney
General new discretion over the registration
of health care practitioners, Congress
explained that "the amendment would
continue to give deference to the opinions of
State licensing authorities, since their
recommendations are the first of the factors
to be considered[.]"' S. Rep. No. 98-225, at
267 (1984).
Against this backdrop of federal regulation,
in 1994, the State of Oregon enacted by
ballot measure the country's first law
authorizing physician-assisted suicide.
Oregon's Death With Dignity Act authorizes
physicians to prescribe lethal doses of
controlled substances to terminally ill
Oregon residents according to procedures
designed to protect vulnerable patients and
ensure that their decisions are reasoned and
voluntary. Oregon voters reaffirmed their
support for the Death With Dignity Act on
November 4, 1997, by defeating a ballot
measure that sought to repeal the law.
Soon thereafter, several members of
Congress, including then-Senator John
Ashcroft, urged then-Attorney General Janet
Reno to declare that physician assisted
suicide violated the CSA. She declined to
do so. In a letter dated January 5, 1998,
Attorney General Reno explained that the
CSA was not "intended to displace the states
as the primary regulators of the medical
profession, or to override a state's
determination as to what constitutes
legitimate medical practice." She concluded
that "the CSA does not authorize [the Drug
Enforcement Administration ("DEA")] to
prosecute, or to revoke DEA registration of,
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a physician who has assisted in a suicide in
compliance with Oregon law."
With a change of administrations came a
change of perspectives. On November 9,
2001, newly appointed Attorney General
John Ashcroft reversed the position of his
predecessor and issued the Directive at issue
here. The Ashcroft Directive proclaims that
physician assisted suicide serves no
"legitimate medical purpose" under 21
C.F.R. § 1306.04 and that specific conduct
authorized by Oregon's Death With Dignity
Act "may *render [a practitioner's]
registration . . . inconsistent with the public
interest' and therefore subject to possible
suspension or revocation." The Directive
specifically targets health care practitioners
in Oregon and instructs the DEA to enforce
this determination "regardless of whether
state law authorizes or permits such conduct
by practitioners."
To be perfectly clear, we take no position on
the merits or morality of physician assisted
suicide. We express no opinion on whether
the practice is inconsistent with the public
interest or constitutes illegitimate medical
care. This case is simply about who gets to
decide. All parties agree that the question
before us is whether Congress authorized the
Attorney General to determine that
physician assisted suicide violates the CSA.
We hold that the Attorney General lacked
Congress' requisite authorization. The
Ashcroft Directive violates the "clear
statement" rule, contradicts the plain
language of the CSA, and contravenes the
express intent of Congress.
We begin with instructions from the
Supreme Court that the "earnest and
profound debate about the morality, legality,
and practicality of physician-assisted
suicide" belongs among state lawmakers.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,
735, 138 L. Ed. 2d 772, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 117
S. Ct. 2302 (1997). In Glucksberg, Justice
O'Connor emphasized that "states are
presently undertaking extensive and serious
evaluation of physician assisted suicide....
In such circumstances, the . . . challenging
task of crafting appropriate procedures for
safeguarding . . . liberty interests is entrusted
to the 'laboratory' of the States . . . in the
first instance."
[Unless Congress' authorization is
"unmistakably clear," the Attorney General
may not exercise control over an area of law
traditionally reserved for state authority,
such as regulation of medical care.]
The Ashcroft Directive is invalid because
Congress has provided no indication-much
less an "unmistakably clear" indication-
that it intended to authorize the Attorney
General to regulate the practice of physician
assisted suicide. By attempting to regulate
physician assisted suicide, the Ashcroft
Directive invokes the outer limits of
Congress' power by encroaching on state
authority to regulate medical practice. [. . .]
The Ashcroft Directive not only lacks clear
congressional authority, it also violates the
plain language of the CSA. We hold that the
Directive exceeds the scope of federal
authority under the CSA, misconstrues the
Attorney General's role under the statute,
and fails to follow explicit instructions for
revoking physician prescription privileges.
The CSA expressly limits federal authority
under the Act to the "field of drug abuse."
Contrary to the Attorney General's
characterization, physician assisted suicide
is not a form of drug "abuse" that Congress
intended the CSA to cover. Physician
assisted suicide is an unrelated, general
medical practice to be regulated by state
lawmakers in the first instance. Glucksberg,
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521 U.S. at 735, 737 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
The Attorney General misreads the CSA
when he concludes that he may evaluate the
public interest "based on any of the five
factors identified in the statute." OLC
Memo at 3 (emphasis added). The CSA
clearly provides that all five public interest
factors "shall be considered."
In sum, the CSA was enacted to combat
drug abuse. To the extent that it authorizes
the federal government to make decisions
regarding the practice of medicine, those
decisions are delegated to the Secretary of
Heath and Human Services, not to the
Attorney General. The Attorney General's
unilateral attempt to regulate general
medical practices historically entrusted to
state lawmakers interferes with the
democratic debate about physician assisted
suicide and far exceeds the scope of his
authority under federal law. We therefore
hold that the Ashcroft Directive is invalid
and may not be enforced.
The petitions for review are GRANTED.
The injunction previously entered by the
district court is ORDERED continued in full
force and effect as the injunction of this
court.
DISSENT: WALLACE, Senior Circuit
Judge, dissenting:
As my colleagues in the majority suggest,
this case is not about the ethics or public
policy implications of physician-assisted
suicide. We need not decide whether the
federal government or the states is better
equipped to regulate physician-assisted
suicide. Setting aside the public policy
aspects of physician-assisted suicide that
evoke passionate feelings, this case involves
a single legal question: is the Attorney
General's interpretation of 21 C.F.R. §
1306.04(a) entitled to deference? Because
our past decisions command deference to the
Attorney General's interpretive rule, I would
deny the petition for review on the merits.
Petitioners argue first that deference to the
Ashcroft Directive is not warranted because
the Attorney General did not satisfy the
APA's notice-and-comment rulemaking
procedures. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (requiring
that agencies give "interested persons"
notice of proposed rules and "an opportunity
to participate in the rule making through
submission of written data, views, or
arguments with or without opportunity for
oral presentation"). The United States
counters that the APA does not require
notice and comment here, because the
Ashcroft Directive is an interpretive rule,
not a legislative rule. If the Ashcroft
Directive is "genuinely an interpretive rule,
it is valid despite the absence of notice and
comment procedures."
We distinguish interpretive and legislative
rules by asking (1) whether, absent the rule,
there would be an inadequate legislative
basis for an enforcement action; (2) whether
the agency "explicitly invoked its general
legislative authority"; and (3) whether "the
rule effectively amends a prior legislative
rule." Id. "If the answer to any of these
questions is affirmative, we have a
legislative, not an interpretive rule."
The Ashcroft Directive does not bear any of
these three hallmarks of a legislative rule.
First, even absent the Ashcroft Directive, the
Attorney General could bring an
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enforcement action because the Controlled
Substances Act itself prohibits distributing a
controlled substance without a prescription,
21 U.S.C. § 829(a), and preexisting
Department of Justice regulations declare
that "[a] prescription for a controlled
substance to be effective must be issued for
a legitimate medical purpose," 21 C.F.R. §
1306.04(a). Second, the Attorney General
did not expressly invoke his statutory
authority to "promulgate . . . any [legislative
rules] . . . which he may deem necessary and
appropriate for the efficient execution of his
functions under" the Controlled Substances
Act. Third, although the Ashcroft Directive
contradicts former-Attorney General Reno's
1998 statement, the Ashcroft Directive is not
inconsistent with any legislative rule.
The Ashcroft Directive does not purport to
"create rights, impose obligations, or effect a
change in existing law pursuant to authority
delegated by Congress." Instead, like other
interpretive rules, the Ashcroft Directive is
"essentially hortatory and instructional,"
clarifying what the Controlled Substances
Act means when applied to a narrowly
defined situation. Alcaraz v. Block, 746
F.2d 593, 613 (9th Cir. 1984); see also
Hemp, 333 F.3d at 1087 (explaining that
interpretive rules "explain, but do not add to,
the substantive law that already exists in the
form of a statute or legislative rule"). Thus,
General Ashcroft's failure to give
Petitioners advance notice and an
opportunity to comment does not invalidate
the Ashcroft Directive.
The majority asserts that the Attorney
General lacks authority to decide whether
physician-assisted suicide is consistent with
"the public interest" and a "legitimate
medical practice" under the Controlled
Substances Act and its implementing
regulations because Congress intended to
preserve the states' traditional authority to
make these determinations. This argument
ignores the Controlled Substances Act's text
and controlling Supreme Court decisions.
[It is axiomatic that the meaning of federal
law is a federal question.] [. .] State law
may be relevant to certain provisions of the
Controlled Substances Act, see, e.g., 21
U.S.C. § 823(f) (instructing the Attorney
General to consider state-law violations
when deciding whether a physician's
registration would be contrary to the public
interest), but nothing in the Controlled
Substances Act plainly evinces a
congressional intent to define "the public
interest" solely according to state law. On
the contrary, section 823 instructs the
Attorney General to identify acts
"inconsistent with the public interest" by
reference to a variety of sources, including a
physician's federal conviction record,
compliance with "Federal . . . laws relating
to controlled substances," and "other
conduct which may threaten public health
and safety." Id. The majority's contention
that the Attorney General cannot suspend or
revoke a physician's registration without
state authorization ignores Mississippi
Band's "plain indication" rule and
contravenes Congress's clearly expressed
intent.
The majority also cites Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735, 737, 138 L.
Ed. 2d 772, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 117 S. Ct. 2302
(1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring), for the
position that the Attorney General must
defer to the Oregon Act because "physician-
assisted suicide is an unrelated, general
medical practice to be regulated by the
States in the first instance." Glucksberg,
however, addressed states' authority to
prohibit physician-assisted suicide in the
absence of federal regulation; the case did
not answer the question whether Congress
may exercise its Commerce Clause power to
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deny physicians access to controlled
substances for physician-assisted suicide.
Rather than place federalism limitations on
the federal government's authority to restrict
physician-assisted suicide, Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion stressed that
"there is no reason to think the democratic
process will not strike the proper balance
between the interests of terminally ill . . .
individuals . . . and the State's interests in
protecting those who might seek to end life
mistakenly or under pressure." Id. at 737.
Simply put, courts should defer to the
political process instead of interposing hasty
constitutional constraints.
Glucksberg does not require the Attorney
General to interpret the Controlled
Substances Act and its implementing
regulations according to state standards of
professional conduct. Rather, the Supreme
Court's decision stands for the broader
proposition that federal courts generally
should keep their distance, allowing the
political process to decide whether and how
to regulate physician-assisted suicide. The
majority's shortsighted decision to declare
the Ashcroft Directive invalid has precisely
the opposite effect.
Finally, the majority argues that the
Ashcroft Directive exceeds the Attorney
General's statutory authority because
Congress has not clearly authorized the
Attorney General to upset the delicate
balance between federal regulation of
controlled substances and state control of
medical practices. As support for this
conclusion, the majority invokes the
Supreme Court's recent analysis in Solid
Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v.
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S.
159, 148 L. Ed. 2d 576 (2001):
Where an administrative interpretation of a
statute invokes the outer limits of Congress'
power, we expect a clear indication that
Congress intended that result. This
requirement stems from our prudential
desire not to needlessly reach constitutional
issues and our assumption that Congress
does not casually authorize administrative
agencies to interpret a statute to push the
limit of congressional authority. This
concern is heightened where the
administrative interpretation alters the
federal-state framework by permitting
federal encroachment upon a traditional
state power.
Solid Waste's clear statement rule is based
upon understandable and significant
federalism concerns, the importance of
which I do not doubt. The question we must
ask ourselves, however, is whether this
canon of statutory interpretation applies to
the case before us.
Turning to the specific issue raised here-
whether the prescription or dispensation of
controlled substances to assist suicide
substantially affects interstate commerce-
we base our assessment on four factors:
1) whether the statute in question regulates
commerce or any sort of economic
enterprise; 2) whether the statute contains
any express jurisdictional element which
might limit its reach to a discrete set of
cases; 3) whether the statute or its legislative
history contains express congressional
findings that the regulated activity affects
interstate commerce; and 4) whether the link
between the regulated activity and a
substantial effect on interstate commerce is
attenuated.
The Ashcroft Directive clearly satisfies
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McCoy's first and the last criteria. The
Ashcroft Directive regulates economic
transactions: physicians generally prescribe
and dispense controlled substances for a fee.
There is no indication here, as there was in
Raich with regards to medicinal marijuana,
that drug-induced physician-assisted suicide
does "not involve [the] sale, exchange, or
distribution" of controlled substances.
Raich, 352 F.3d at 1229. The link between
these transactions and their effect on
interstate commerce is not attenuated simply
because relatively few Oregonians use
controlled substances for assisted suicide.
We evaluate whether an activity's link to
interstate commerce is attenuated by
assessing whether its effect on interstate
commerce is sufficiently direct, Solid Waste,
531 U.S. at 195; McCoy, 323 F.3d at 1123-
24, and we assess individual provisions as
"parts of a wider regulatory scheme" (i.e.,
the Controlled Substances Act), which
regulates a field of drug-related activity that
has "a 'substantial affect' on interstate
commerce," Tisor, 96 F.3d at 375. Here
Congress naturally and directly reduces the
amount of a controlled substance that flows
through the interstate channels when it
prohibits the substance's distribution for a
particular use. Thus, the link between drug
prescriptions and interstate commerce is
sufficiently direct and substantial even if the
drugs ultimately are used in intrastate
activities such as physician-assisted suicide
and the activities' disaggregated effect on
interstate commerce is small.
Having demonstrated the fallacies of the
foregoing challenges to the Ashcroft
Directive, I now consider what standard of
review this court should apply when
assessing the Ashcroft Directive's validity.
The degree of deference we accord an
interpretive rule depends upon whether the
rule construes a statute or an agency
regulation.
If the Ashcroft Directive represents a
statutory interpretation, it enjoys deference
as defined in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323
U.S. 134, 89 L. Ed. 124, 65 S. Ct. 161
(1944). Omohundro v United States, 300
F.3d 1065, 1067-68 (9th Cir. 2002). Under
Skidmore, "the weight of such a judgment in
a particular case will depend upon the
thoroughness evident in its consideration,
the validity of its reasoning, its consistency
with earlier and later pronouncements, and
all those factors which give it power to
persuade, if lacking power to control."
Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140. Especially
relevant under Skidmore is the fact that the
Ashcroft Directive reverses the agency's
earlier interpretation. [. . .
If the Ashcroft Directive interprets an
agency regulation, rather than the Controlled
Substances Act itself, we must accord it
"substantial deference." Thomas Jefferson
Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512, 129 L.
Ed. 2d 405, 114 S. Ct. 2381 (1994). Under
this highly deferential standard, our task is
not to decide which among several
competing interpretations best serves the
regulatory purpose. Rather, the agency's
interpretation must be given controlling
weight unless it is plainly erroneous or
inconsistent with the regulation. [. .
In my view, the Ashcroft Directive
constitutes an interpretation of a regulation
rather than a statutory interpretation. The
Ashcroft Directive's single interpretive act
is to "determine that assisting suicide is not
a 'legitimate medical purpose' within the
meaning of 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04 (2001)."
Ashcroft Directive, 66 Fed. Reg. at 56,608.
The Petitioners point to General Ashcroft's
240
warning that prescribing a controlled
substance to assist suicide may render a
physician's registration subject to
suspension or revocation under section
824(a)(4). This statement was not an
interpretation of the Controlled Substances
Act, however, but an explanation of the
logical consequences flowing from General
Ashcroft's interpretation of 21 C.F.R. §
1306.04. If assisting suicide is not a
"legitimate medical purpose," the direct
result is that a physician cannot prescribe
controlled substances for this purpose
without violating Controlled Substances Act
section 829 and thereby risking suspension
or revocation of their registration under
sections 823 and 824.
Although I am convinced of the merits of
my legal argument, I admit that even if I
persuaded one of my colleagues to join me,
my opinion would not be a final chapter.
Those who are uneasy with my position (as I
assume Petitioners will be) should see its
limited grasp. The Ashcroft Directive
constitutes a final agency action, but it
surely will not be the last word on
physician-assisted suicide. The Ashcroft
Directive does not spell the end of the
public's "earnest and profound debate about
the morality, legality, and practicality of
physician-assisted suicide," Glucksberg, 521
U.S. at 735, nor does it halt states' extensive
and serious evaluation of physician-assisted
suicide and other related issues,"
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 736, 737
(O'Connor, J., concurring). State legislators
may supplement the Ashcroft Directive's
sanctions, and they may authorize
alternative methods for assisting suicide that
do not involve the prescription of controlled
substances.
More to my point, the Ashcroft Directive is
not even an immutable expression of federal
policy. A change in presidential
administrations or a shift in the current
President or Attorney General's perspective
might precipitate the Ashcroft Directive's
rescission. Certainly, Congress is free to
enact legislation limiting or counteracting
the Ashcroft Directive's effects. Although
opinions differ over the propriety of assisted
suicide, I fully subscribe to Justice
O'Connor's canny observation that there is
simply "no reason to think that the
democratic process will not strike the proper
balance between the interests of terminally
ill, mentally competent individuals who
would seek to end their suffering and the
[government]'s interests in protecting those
who might seek to end life mistakenly or
under pressure." Id. In short, we should
trust the democratic process.
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"Justices to Hear Case on Oregon's Suicide Law"
Los Angeles Times
February 23, 2005
David G. Savage
The Supreme Court agreed Tuesday to hear
the Bush administration's challenge to the
nation's only right-to-die law, setting the
stage for a showdown over whether states
may permit doctors to prescribe drugs
intended to end patients' lives.
The justices will decide whether Oregon's
Death With Dignity Act violates federal
drug-control laws. The case will be argued
during the court's fall term.
Oregon's voters have approved the right-to-
die measure twice. In 1994, the law passed
51% to 49%, but never went into effect
because of a court ruling. In 1997, voters
rejected an effort to repeal the law,
endorsing it 60% to 40%.
The law extends a right to die only to
capable adults who are diagnosed as
"suffering from a terminal disease" that is
likely to take their lives within six months.
A second doctor must confirm that the
patient is dying, acting voluntarily and
competent to choose to end his or her life.
Only then may a doctor prescribe lethal
medication.
Hundreds of patients have consulted doctors
and obtained lethal medication in the seven
years since the law took effect, supporters of
the law said; 171 have followed through.
"Many patients are comforted by having the
medication that gives them the choice to
hasten their death, but it is used rarely," said
Kathryn L. Tucker, legal director for
Compassion in Dying, the Portland, Ore.,
group that sponsored the law.
Traditionally, states regulate the practice of
medicine and license physicians to work
within their borders.
In 1998, conservatives in Congress, led by
Rep. Henry J. Hyde (R-Ill.), urged federal
action to block Oregon's law. But then-Atty.
Gen. Janet Reno refused to intervene,
determining that Oregon had set stringent
rules to assure that only mentally competent
terminally ill patients could obtain the
medication.
But in November 2001, Atty. Gen. John
Ashcroft said he would seek to punish
doctors who prescribed the medication to
dying patients, regardless of the wishes of
Oregon's voters.
"I hereby determine that assisting suicide is
not a legitimate medical purpose," Ashcroft
said. Doctors who did so would be in
violation of the federal Controlled
Substances Act, he said, and would have
their right to prescribe medicine suspended
or revoked.
Ashcroft's order set in motion the legal
battle to be heard by the Supreme Court.
When Oregon Atty. Gen. Hardy Myers,
several patients and others challenged
Ashcroft, a federal judge in Portland
blocked the order from taking effect.
Ashcroft appealed, and the U.S. 9th Circuit
Court ruled last year that the attorney
general had exceeded his authority.
The federal drug control law "was enacted to
combat drug abuse," wrote Judge Richard
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Tallman.
"The attorney general's unilateral attempt to
regulate general medical practices
historically entrusted to state lawmakers
interferes with the democratic debate about
physician-assisted suicide and far exceeds
the scope of his authority."
Tallman's opinion included a subtle jab at
Ashcroft. He wrote that the attorney general
was seeking to "alter the usual constitutional
balance between the states and the federal
government," quoting a 1991 Supreme
Court ruling in Gregory vs. Ashcroft.
In that ruling, Ashcroft-then the governor
of Missouri-won a victory for states' rights
by arguing that state judges could be
subjected to a mandatory state retirement
law, despite a federal law that barred such
retirements. The high court agreed with
Ashcroft that states historically had
controlled their judiciaries. Adopting that
theme in the right-to-die case, Tallman said
control of medical practice had been
historically within the powers of the state.
On Nov. 10, the day he announced his
resignation from the Bush Cabinet, Ashcroft
asked the Supreme Court to reverse the 9th
Circuit ruling. He accused the appeals court
of "misconstruing and dramatically
expanding the scope" of the Gregory vs.
Ashcroft decision in a way that "threatens to
undermine federal authority."
It takes the votes of at least four of the nine
justices to hear an appeal; in a one-line order
Tuesday, the court announced it had voted to
hear the case-renamed Gonzales vs.
Oregon, now that Alberto R. Gonzales is
U.S. attorney general.
Opponents of the Oregon law applauded the
court's decision.
"The court has an opportunity to ensure that
patients receive truly compassionate care
and pain relief by limiting physicians' use of
narcotics for healing-not death," said Dr.
David Stevens, executive director of the
17,000-member Christian Medical Assn.
Oregon officials and leaders of the right-to-
die movement said they were disappointed
that the high court had intervened. They
noted that voters had approved the law
twice, and that two lower courts had upheld
it.
"This is an opportunity for the Death With
Dignity law to win at the highest level, to
finally be validated on a national stage," said
Eli D. Stutsman, a Portland lawyer who
helped draft the legislation and now
represents a physician and a pharmacist who
challenged Ashcroft's order. "We are
confident that states' rights and the rights of
the terminally ill will carry the day."
Eight years ago, the Supreme Court took up
the right-to-die issue, but in a different
context. A judge in Seattle and the 9th
Circuit had ruled that dying patients had a
constitutional right to end their lives with
the help of a doctor, despite a Washington
state law that made assisted suicide illegal.
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed
the 9th Circuit saying there was no such
constitutional right, but adding that the
decision on physician-assisted suicide
should be left to the states, not judges.
"Throughout the nation, Americans are
engaged in an earnest and profound debate
about the morality, legality and practicality
of physician-assisted suicide," Chief Justice
William H. Rehnquist said. "Our holding
permits this debate to continue, as it should
in a democratic society."
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On Tuesday, lawyers for Compassion in
Dying cited the high court's 1997 statement
as a reason to uphold the Oregon law.
"The court invited the states to grapple with
the issue of physician aid in dying," Tucker,
the group's legal director, said. "Oregon has
done so for seven years, and serves as a
model for other states."
Legislation based on the Oregon law was
introduced in the California Assembly last
week. The Vermont Legislature
considering a similar proposal.
is
The court is not likely to rule on the issue
until early next year.
If the Bush administration wins, the decision
would all but void Oregon's law and prevent
other states from adopting similar measures.
If Oregon prevails, it could encourage other
states or their voters to seek passage of
similar laws.
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"Court Rejects Ashcroft; Backs Suicide Law"
Los Angeles Times
May 27, 2004
Henry Weinstein
Atty. Gen. John Ashcroft lost a major round
Wednesday in his attempt to block Oregon's
assisted-suicide law, as a federal appeals
court panel ruled that his efforts exceeded
his authority.
Since Oregon's so-called Death With
Dignity law went into effect in 1997, 171
people-most of them with cancer-have
used the law to hasten their deaths,
according to the state's Department of
Health Services.
Ashcroft, who began campaigning against
Oregon's law when he was a U.S. senator
from Missouri, tried to block it in November
2001 by issuing an order aimed at doctors.
The order said physicians who dispensed
lethal barbiturates to patients under
Oregon's law would be violating the federal
statute designed to restrict narcotics
trafficking and illegal diversion of drugs.
Under that policy, the Justice Department
would have been able to go to court to strip
doctors who assisted in suicides of their
right to prescribe medicine.
That effort by Ashcroft "far exceeds the
scope of his authority under federal law,"
Judge Richard A. Tallman wrote in the
opinion for the U.S. 9th Circuit Court of
Appeals in San Francisco.
Ashcroft's "unilateral attempt to regulate
general medical practices historically
entrusted to state lawmakers interferes with
the democratic debate about physician-
assisted suicide" and is "unlawful and
unenforceable," Tallman wrote.
The 9th Circuit is known for its liberal
opinions and has frequently been reversed
by the U.S. Supreme Court on high-profile
issues.
But in this case Tallman, a former federal
prosecutor appointed to the court by
President Clinton, is generally considered
one of the appeals court's more conservative
members.
Moreover, the Supreme Court considered
assisted-suicide cases from two states in the
late 1990s, ultimately upholding Oregon's
right to enact its law, so the justices may
have little desire to revisit the issue, legal
analysts said.
In one of those cases, the high court said that
"the earnest and profound debate" around
the country "about the morality, legality and
practicality of physician-assisted suicide"
should be left to state lawmakers.
Oregon is the only
physician-assisted
others, including
practice.
state to have enacted a
suicide law. Many
California, ban the
In order to invoke the law and obtain the
lethal barbiturates, a patient must
demonstrate to two physicians that he has no
more than six months to live. Doctors have
to be convinced that a patient is mentally
competent to make the decision, and the
patient must administer the medicine to
himself.
"By criminalizing medical practices
specifically authorized under Oregon law,
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the Ashcroft directive interferes with
Oregon's authority to regulate medical care
within its borders," Tallman wrote.
"The Ashcroft directive not only lacks clear
congressional authority, it also violates the
plain language of the Controlled Substances
Act," he wrote.
"We express no opinion on whether the
practice is inconsistent with the public
interest or constitutes illegitimate medical
care," Tallman wrote, referring to assisted
suicides. "This case is simply about who
gets to decide," he added, noting that the law
had been approved twice by Oregon voters,
in 1994 and 1997.
Tallman was joined in the 2-1 opinion by
Judge Donald Lay.
The dissenting judge, J. Clifford Wallace,
said the court should have accorded
"substantial deference" to Ashcroft's
conclusion that physician-assisted suicide
did not serve a "legitimate medical
purpose."
Ashcroft had the authority to take the action
he did, and "Congress is free to enact
legislation limiting or counteracting" the
attorney general's order if it disapproves,
Wallace wrote.
Justice Department spokesman Charles
Miller said department attorneys were
reviewing the decision and would not
immediately comment.
Even some legal scholars who are ordinarily
in tune with Ashcroft's positions said they
thought the attorney general was on shaky
legal ground.
"As someone who often approves of the
work of the attorney general and who also
thinks assisted suicide is morally
indefensible, I understand John Ashcroft's
motivations to intervene in this matter," said
Douglas Kmiec of Pepperdine Law School.
"Yet, on the law, his regulatory intervention
was more questionable," he added. "The
Supreme Court rightly held that the issue of
assisted suicide is one to be debated and
resolved at the state level, and Congress did
not clearly provide otherwise in the
Controlled Substances Act."
The ruling was hailed by Oregon officials as
well as patients who support the law.
Don James, a 78-year-old retired
schoolteacher from Portland who was one of
the plaintiffs challenging Ashcroft's order,
said he was delighted with the ruling.
James, who has prostate cancer
confined to a wheelchair, said he
heavy medication though he was
terminally ill.
and is
was on
not yet
"I'm not in a hurry to die. I want to stay
active as long as I can," he said. "I'm not
sure what I will do when that moment
comes, but I wanted the option" of hastening
death.
James, a registered Republican, added, "I
resent that Ashcroft meddled in our affairs
in this democracy to try to deprive us of
something we want."
George Eighmey, executive director of the
Oregon chapter of Compassion in Dying, the
organization that led the battle to get the
suicide law enacted, also praised the ruling.
"I believe today's decision by the 9th Circuit
has been a huge victory for Oregon and for
all Oregonians who believe in end-of-life
choices," he said. "We hope the message is
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received by Atty. Gen. Ashcroft that it is
time for him to keep his hands off Oregon's
law and Oregonians."
But N. Gregory Hamilton, a doctor from
Portland and the former president of
Physicians for Compassionate Care, an
organization opposed to the Oregon law,
denounced the ruling.
"It's amazing that a federal court would
allow any state to nullify federal regulatory
authority and federal law," he said. "If
Oregon is allowed to exempt itself from
federal law about the misuse of controlled
substances for the purposes of overdosing
patients, what is to stop any state from
exempting itself from other important
federal regulations and laws?"
Oregon Right to Life officials also criticized
the decision and expressed hope that
Ashcroft would appeal further.
Gayle Atteberry, executive director of the
group, called the ruling a tragedy.
Some patients who become eligible for the
lethal barbiturates "are then abandoned to
depression instead of receiving the help they
need," she said.
Arthur Caplan, director of the Center for
Bioethics at the University of Pennsylvania,
said, however, that abuses foreseen by the
law's opponents had not occurred in
Oregon.
The suicide law has not been used as often
as predicted, in part because Oregon's
doctors and nurses have done a good job on
end-of-life palliative care, he said.
After voters passed the law, Ashcroft was
among several members of Congress who
urged then-Atty. Gen. Janet Reno to take
action against physicians who applied it. In
1998, Reno said such action was
unwarranted. Ashcroft reversed that decision
when he became attorney general.
The next day, U.S. District Judge Robert E.
Jones in Portland issued a temporary
restraining order blocking the Ashcroft
directive.
"To allow an attorney general-an
appointed executive whose tenure depends
entirely on whatever administration occupies
the White House-to determine the
legitimacy of a particular medical practice . .
. would be unprecedented," Jones, an
appointee of President Reagan, wrote a few
months later in an opinion making the
restraining order permanent.
The Justice Department appealed, setting the
stage for Wednesday's ruling.
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"Oregon's Right to Decide"
News and Observer (Raleigh, North Carolina)
March 4, 2005
Erwin Chemerinsky and Judith Daar
The U.S. Supreme Court now has before it an
important opportunity to make clear that state
governments have the authority to enact
death-with-dignity laws.
Efforts to pass laws allowing physician-
assisted suicide for terminally ill patients have
been mounted from Hawaii to Maine, though
Oregon remains the lone state with an active
Death With Dignity Act.
Since taking office in 2001, members of the
Bush administration have worked to
dismantle the Oregon law, signaling to other
states that similar enactments are highly
unwelcome. The Supreme Court should
reject the ill-advised attempt by the federal
government to prevent such state laws.
In 1994, Oregon voters approved an initiative
to allow physician-assisted suicide. Oregon's
act authorizes physicians to prescribe lethal
doses of controlled substances to terminally
ill residents according to procedures designed
to protect vulnerable patients and ensure that
their decisions are reasoned and voluntary. In
1997, voters rejected an initiative that would
have repealed this law, reaffirming their
desire to access compassionate care at the end
of life.
There were several efforts to try to have
Congress, by statute, pre-empt the law by
prohibiting the use of prescription drugs in
physician-assisted suicides. Each of these
attempts at federal legislation failed.
Being unable to stop Oregon's law by
legislation, opponents took another approach:
they asked then-Attomey General Janet Reno
to announce that doctors who participate in
physician-assisted suicide would lose their
ability to write prescriptions. The federal
Controlled Substances Act authorizes the
attorney general to revoke a physician's
ability to prescribe medication if it's
determined the physician has "committed
such acts as would render his registration ...
inconsistent with the public interest."
The law, enacted in 1970 as part of the "war
on drugs," was clearly about giving the
federal government the authority to stop
doctors who were fueling illegal drug
transactions by writing large numbers of
prescriptions for controlled substances.
Reno refused this request and explained that
the federal government had no authority to
overturn Oregon's choice. She emphasized
that regulation of physicians was historically
left to state governments and that the federal
statute could not be stretched to take away a
state's power to allow physician-assisted
suicide.
This is clearly correct as a matter of federal
law, and especially as a matter of federalism.
But upon becoming attorney general, John
Ashcroft issued a directive that sought to stop
physician-assisted suicide in Oregon by
criminalizing medical procedures specifically
authorized by state law.
The Ashcroft Directive proclaims that
physician-assisted suicide serves no
"legitimate medical purpose" and that the
federal government could revoke the power to
issue prescriptions for any Oregon doctor who
assists a dying patient, "regardless of whether
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state law . . . permits such conduct by
practitioners."
Both a federal district court in Oregon and the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
ruled against the attorney general and held
that the federal government had no authority
to stop Oregon's Death with Dignity Act. The
courts explained that the federal statute relied
on by the attorney general did not permit
intrusion into a state's authority to regulate
medical care within its borders. On Feb. 22,
the Supreme Court announced it would
review the case.
The court must use this opportunity to affirm
the authority of state governments to choose
for themselves whether to allow physician-
assisted suicide for terminally ill patients.
The Ashcroft Directive has the federal
government, through fiat by the attorney
general, taking over an area-regulating the
practice of medicine-that always has been
left to the states. Conservatives have
throughout American history proclaimed the
importance of federalism and states' rights.
Now is the time for the Supreme Court to be
true to that commitment to states' rights and
uphold the law adopted by Oregon's voters.
The Oregon experience shows the many
positive developments that come from
recognizing the fundamental personal right to
choose the manner of one's death. In its
seven-year history, the law has been activated
by a scant 171 people, a fraction of the
eligible Oregonians who have passed this
world. But myriad personal accounts reveal
that the act has comforted thousands of
irreversibly ill patients who found the safety
net of physician assistance a tempering force
against impending death. Moreover, the law's
presence has been linked with advances in
palliative, comfort and hospice care, all
essential allies on the journey home.
No choice is more deeply personal or more
profoundly important than whether to live in
pain or die in peace. We have seen terminally
ill individuals in great pain begging to have a
physician help end their suffering. That
should be the right of every person, a right the
federal government has no moral or legal
authority to usurp.
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"False Federalism"
National Review
June 8, 2005
Wesley J. Smith
Does Oregon have the constitutional right to
force the United States government to
permit state doctors to assist patient suicides
with federally controlled substances
(narcotics)? Or is the federal government
entitled under the Controlled Substances Act
(CSA) to prevent these federally regulated
drugs from being prescribed for lethal use
regardless of state law? The Supreme Court
will tell us soon in Gonzales v. Oregon, a
case that will not only influence the course
of the euthanasia and assisted-suicide
debate, but will also profoundly impact the
delicate balance of power between "states
rights" and the overarching sovereignty of
the federal government.
So far, court decisions have favored Oregon.
Most recently, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals ruled that Oregon's right to regulate
medical practice within its borders prevents
the federal government from punishing state
doctors who prescribe federally controlled
substances to end their terminally ill
patients' lives. Under this view, the federal
government can punish doctors who
prescribe lethal doses of controlled
substances for use in assisted suicide in
states where the act is illegal. But punishing
Oregon doctors would violate the principle
of federalism because assisted suicide has
been explicitly made a proper medical
practice under Oregon law.
I have argued previously in NRO that it is
actually the other way around-that Oregon
is violating the principle of federalism by
seeking to prevent the federal government
from pursuing its own legitimate public
policy. Now, this view has been
substantially supported in the just-
announced Gonzales v. Raich, in which the
Supreme Court ruled 6-3 that the federal
government is entitled to enforce the CSA's
proscription of the use of marijuana-even
though California permits the drug to be
possessed legally for medicinal purposes;
even though the marijuana in question was
clearly being used by California residents
for such medicinal purposes; and even
though the marijuana was unquestionably
home-grown and exclusively used for in-
home consumption.
Most of the issues dealt with in Raich
involved arcane interpretations of the
interstate commerce clause, a matter now
unlikely to be crucial in deciding Gonzales
v. Oregon. But the majority opinion, written
(surprisingly) by Justice John Paul Stevens,
also invoked the Constitution's Supremacy
Clause as "unambiguously" providing "that
if there is any conflict between federal and
state law, federal law shall prevail."
As applied in Raich, this means that the
federal government is entitled to enforce
federal law against medical marijuana users
even in the face of contrary state laws, a
ruling clearly applicable to the assisted-
suicide controversy. And if the Court found
this to be true for medical marijuana-
which, after all, involves mere symptom
relief-it hardly seems likely that it would
reach a drastically different conclusion
regarding the prescription of more potent
controlled substances with the intent to kill.
True, marijuana has been determined by
Congress to have no legitimate uses, while
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the controlled substances used in assisted
suicide do have proper medical uses, such as
aiding sleep or controlling pain. But this
should be a factual distinction without a
legal difference in deciding the assisted-
suicide case since Congress expressly
delegated the task of determining what
medical uses and under what circumstances
controlled substances could be put to the
attorney general. Indeed, the Oregon case
began when the state sued to prevent former
attorney general John Ashcroft from
enforcing his decision to preclude the use of
federally controlled substances in assisted
suicide.
What about the oft-made argument that the
states are the test tubes of democracy, and
therefore Oregon's decision to legalize
assisted suicide should be allowed to
proceed unfettered by a contrary federal
public policy? Justice O'Conner accepted
this argument with great enthusiasm in the
final section of her dissent, opining that
while she would not have personally
supported legalizing medical marijuana, the
majority ruling stifled "an express choice by
some States, concerned for the lives and
liberties of their people, to regulate medical
marijuana differently" than the federal
policy.
If the Court accepts this view, Oregon will
prevail. But this is unlikely. Justice
O'Connor was the lone voice arguing the
test-tube-of-democracy theory. Indeed, her
two fellow Raich dissenters, William
Rehnquist and Clarence Thomas,
specifically did not join in this section of her
opinion. (Thomas, in an individual dissent,
did allude to states deciding for themselves
"how to safeguard the health and welfare of
their citizens." But by not signing on to
O'Connor's more broadly stated views, he
seems to have limited his dissent in this
regard to the unusual factual context of the
Raich case, which involved the growing of a
mere six marijuana plants.)
Gonzales v. Raich, alongside the earlier
unanimous Ashcroft v. Oakland Cannabis
Buyer's Cooperative, points clearly in the
direction (barring a technical defect in the
federal government's approach) to the
Supreme Court's strongly affirming a federal
right to proscribe the use of federally
controlled substances in assisted suicide
unfettered by state laws to the contrary.
That would be a proper federalist result. If
so, come this time next year, assisted suicide
will remain fully legal in Oregon-just as
medical marijuana remains legal in
California-but doctors there will have to
find other ways to hasten the deaths of
patients than prescribing controlled
substances. Such an outstanding outcome
would not only protect the vulnerable, but
also send a clarion societal message that
killing is not a legitimate medical act.
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"Why Ashcroft is Wrong on Assisted Suicide"
Commentary
February 2002
Nelson Lund
Alone among the American states, Oregon
has legalized physician-assisted suicide.
This step was thoroughly debated and
solemnly taken by the voters of Oregon not
once but twice. In 1994, a narrow majority
approved the policy in a formal referendum,
and a much larger majority rejected a repeal
initiative three years later.
But now, in a ruling issued last November 9,
Attorney General John Ashcroft has
reversed a decision of his predecessor, Janet
Reno, and decided that Oregon doctors may
no longer use federally regulated drugs to
assist their patients in committing suicide.
This decision raises important and troubling
questions. Although I support the goal of
discouraging physician-assisted suicide, I
also believe that Ashcroft is pursuing that
goal in a way that may undermine a
fundamental constitutional principle.
To see why the Attorney General's approach
to the problem is questionable, we need to
begin with a closer look at the problem
itself. In my view, the people of Oregon
made a serious mistake in legalizing assisted
suicide. Much of the current enthusiasm for
this practice is driven by a perfectly
understandable yearning for patient
autonomy and by an equally understandable
reluctance to let the frequently arrogant
medical profession force us to endure
degrading, technologically extended deaths.
Unfortunately, the legalization of assisted
suicide is also a big step down a road that
will finally reduce patient autonomy rather
than enhance it.
We need not go down this road. The fear
that obsessive doctors will inflict a
demeaning death by means of high-tech
"heroic measures" is entirely legitimate, but
no patient need consent to unwanted medical
treatments, and directives given in advance
can guard against their use on those who are
unconscious. And if doctors are too often
ignoring "do not resuscitate" orders, as they
may be, the answer is hardly to give them a
new power that can easily be used to
substitute their judgment for their patients'
as to whether a life is worth living. Yet this
is exactly the power that the people of
Oregon have decided to give their
physicians.
Three principal benefits arise from leaving
the states to deal with local concerns. First,
a multiplicity of jurisdictions creates choices
that enable citizens to achieve the mix of
policies that most closely satisfies their
individual wants and needs. Second, and
closely related, federalism promotes
competition among jurisdictions: state
governments that commit serious errors in
satisfying their residents' preferences incur
the costs of emigration (and immigration
forgone) by the taxpayers who make
government possible. Finally, the allocation
of political power to the state level inhibits
the ability of national government to shift
costs and benefits from one place to another,
and thus to create incentives for pork-barrel
policies whose costs exceed their benefits.
People can and do have different preferences
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about this issue, which are presumably
based on their differing assessments of the
risks and benefits to themselves and those
they care about. Convinced though I am
that the risks of allowing physician-assisted
suicide outweigh the benefits, it would be
silly to pretend that no benefits exist, and
presumptuous to suppose that I might not be
wrong. Nor is it easy to see why Oregon
and other state governments should be
considered less capable than the federal
government of settling on appropriate
policies in the light of new experience and
information, including new developments in
medicine and the medical profession.
When the Supreme Court wisely declined to
create a constitutional right to assisted
suicide, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
pointed out that in this area there was no
obvious need for judicial intrusion:
Every one of us at some point may be
affected by our own or a family member's
terminal illness. There is no reason to think
the democratic process will not strike the
proper balance between the interests of
terminally ill, mentally competent
individuals who would seek to end their
suffering and the state's interests in
protecting those who might seek to end life
mistakenly or under pressure.
For the very same reason, there is no
obvious need for the federal government to
interfere with Oregon's experiment.
That is hardly to say there will be no bad
effects from Oregon's new policy. To the
contrary, vulnerable people will likely be
pressured to end their lives prematurely;
others will become more distrustful of
doctors, and perhaps less willing to submit
to treatment. Some physicians will take
another big step away from their proper role
as healers and comforters, and will become
increasingly corrupted by the very different
role of deciding whose lives are worth
living. Euthanasia of nonconsenting victims
is also entirely possible.
As bad as these effects may be, however,
they will be visited almost entirely on
Oregonians, and will not threaten the
citizens of other states. Nor will Oregon's
policy necessarily spread to other states.
Every state in the union remains free to
outlaw physician-assisted suicide and to
enforce its laws as vigorously as it sees fit.
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Central Virginia Community College v. Katz
(04-885)
Ruling Below: (Katz v. Cent. Va. Comm. Coil., 106 Fed. Appx. 341 (6th Cir. 2004), cert.
granted 125 S. Ct. 1727, 161 L.Ed.2d 601, 73 U.S.L.W. 3593 (U.S. Apr. 4, 2005)(No. 04-885)).
Bernard Katz is supervising the bankruptcy of Wallace's Bookstores, which operated a chain on
college campuses. The chain claims to be owed money by the state colleges involved in this suit.
The colleges raised the defense of state sovereign immunity. The United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Kentucky was affirmed by the Sixth Circuit in following Hood v.
Tennessee Student Assistance Corporation, 319 F.3d 755 (6th Cir. 2003), which held that the
Bankruptcy Clause of the United States Constitution gives Congress the authority to abrogate
state sovereign immunity.
Note: Hood v. Tennessee Student Assistance Corporation contains the reasoning relevant to this
case. An excerpt follows on pages 255 - 264.
Question Presented: May Congress use the Article I Bankruptcy Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8,
cl. 4, to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity?
Bernard KATZ, Appellee,
V.
CENTRAL VIRGINIA COMMUNITY COLLEGE, Appellants
United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit
Decided August 4, 2004
[Unpublished]
OPINION:
PER CURIAM. Appellants, four state-
supported institutions of higher education in
Virginia, brought this suit for the purpose of
challenging this court's decision in Hood v.
Tennessee Student Assistance Corporation,
319 F.3d 755 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that
the Article I Bankruptcy Clause grants
Congress the authority to abrogate states'
sovereign immunity), affd on other
grounds, 539 U.S. 986, 124 S. Ct. 45, 156 L.
Ed. 2d 703 (2004). The district court,
finding that appellants raised the very
arguments that this court rejected in Hood,
affirmed the orders of the bankruptcy court.
Because we are bound to follow a decision
of a prior, panel, see Moltan Co, v. Eagle-
Picher Indus., Inc., 55 F.3d 1171, 1176 (6th
Cir 1995) ("We cannot overturn the prior
published decision of another panel and are
therefore bound by these previous
decisions."), and because the parties agree
that Hood applies here, we affirm the
judgment of the district court.
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Pamela L. HOOD, Appellee,
V.
TENNESSEE STUDENT ASSISTANCE CORPORATION,
Appellant
United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit
Decided February 3, 2003
319 F.3d 755
[Excerpt: Some citations and footnotes omitted]
OPINION: KAREN NELSON MOORE,
Circuit Judge.
The Tennessee Student Assistance
Corporation ("TSAC") appeals from the
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel's decision
denying TSAC's motion to dismiss for lack
of jurisdiction. After receiving a discharge
in her Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings,
plaintiff Pamela Hood filed for a hardship
discharge from her student loans and named
TSAC in the complaint. The bankruptcy
court denied TSAC's motion to dismiss on
the grounds of sovereign immunity, and the
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed that
decision. TSAC now appeals, arguing that
the Constitution's Bankruptcy Clause, Art. I,
sec. 8, does not give Congress the power to
abrogate states' sovereign immunity in 11
U.S.C. § 106(a). Applying the analysis that
the Supreme Court set forth in Seminole
Tribe, we conclude that Article I, section 8
of the Constitution gives Congress the
power to abrogate states' sovereign
immunity. Accordingly, we AFFIRM and
REMAND.
I. BACKGROUND
On June 4, 1999, Pamela Hood received a
discharge on her no-asset Chapter 7
bankruptcy petition. Because 11 U.S.C. §
523(a)(8) prohibits discharge of student
debts held by governmental bodies except
upon showing of "an undue hardship," on
September 14 of that year Hood filed an
adversary proceeding for a hardship
discharge of her student loans. TSAC.
whom Hood had named as a defendant,
moved to dismiss the complaint on the
grounds of sovereign immunity. The
Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of
Tennessee denied the motion to dismiss,
holding that Congress acted pursuant to a
valid grant of constitutional authority when
it abrogated the states' sovereign immunity
in 11 US.C. § 106(a).
A unanimous Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
affirmed and ruled that "as a part of the plan
of the Constitutional Convention, the States
ceded to Congress their sovereignty over
bankruptcy discharge matters." Hood v.
Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. (In re
Hood), 262 B.R. 412, 413 (B.A.P. 6th Cir.
2001). Although the panel acknowledged
that Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,
517 U.S. 44, 134 L. Ed. 2d 252, 116 S. Ct.
1114 (1996), could be interpreted as
precluding Congress from ever abrogating
states' sovereign immunity under any of its
Article I powers, the panel interpreted The
Federalist No. 81 and No. 32 to distinguish
bankruptcy, along with naturalization, from
the rest of the Article I powers. See Hood,
262 B.R. at 417-419. The panel noted that,
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with respect to bankruptcy and
naturalization, the Constitution granted
Congress the power to establish "uniform
Laws," U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, ci. 4
(emphasis added), not mere laws. Hood,
262 B.R. at 417. According to the panel,
The Federalist No. 32 shows that Congress's
power to make uniform laws required states
to surrender their own power to make such
laws and thus an important degree of their
sovereignty. Id. at 418-19. Because limits
on sovereignty are by their very nature
limits on sovereign immunity, the panel
concluded that Congress's power to make
laws on bankruptcy carries with it the power
to abrogate states' sovereign immunity. Id
Congress clearly exercised that power in II
US.C. § 106(a), which specifically
abrogated the states' sovereign immunity
with respect to actions under § 523.
II. ANALYSIS
Until 1976, a debtor could discharge his or
her student loan debts in ordinary
bankruptcy proceedings, whether or not the
creditor was a state or state agency. If a
state wished to assert an interest in a debtor's
assets, the state had to file a claim, thereby
waiving its sovereign immunity under New
York v. Irving Trust Co., 288 US. 329, 333,
77 L. Ed. 815, 53 S. Ct. 389 (1933). In the
Education Amendments of 1976, however,
Congress gave public entities that issued
student loans a significant benefit: Congress
prohibited the discharge of student loan
debts in ordinary, non-adversary bankruptcy
proceedings unless the loan had been in
repayment for more than five years. For all
loans that had been in repayment for less
than five years, however, Congress
prohibited discharge unless the debtor
initiated a separate adversary proceeding
and demonstrated that repaying the state
would "impose an undue hardship."
Education Amendments of 1976, Pub. L.
No. 94-482, § 439A(a), 90 Stat. 2081, 2141
(1976) (codified at 20 US.C. § 1087-3
(1976)) (repealed in 1978 and replaced with
current 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)). Having
received the benefit of a special adversary
proceeding that makes it more difficult for
debtors to discharge their student loan debts,
TSAC here seeks to exploit that benefit by
asserting its sovereign immunity and
preventing discharge altogether. In other
words, TSAC asks if it can have its cake and
eat it, too. We conclude that it cannot.
The Eleventh Amendment provides:
The Judicial power of the
United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit
in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State.
U.S. Const. amend XI. This bar to federal
jurisdiction also extends to suits against a
state by its own citizens. See Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10, 33 L. Ed. 842, 10
S. Ct. 504 (1890). Thus private suits against
states may proceed only if the state waives
its sovereign immunity or if Congress,
acting pursuant to a valid constitutional
authority, abrogates the state's sovereign
immunity.
B. Abrogation of Sovereign Immunity
1. The Seminole Tribe Framework
The Supreme Court has addressed the
question of valid abrogations of state
sovereign immunity in a series of cases that
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began with Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 134 L. Ed 2d 252, 116
S. Ct. 1114 (1996). In Seminole Tribe, the
Court ruled that the Indian Commerce
Clause, which authorizes Congress to
"regulate Commerce . . . with the Indian
Tribes," U.S. Const., Art. 1, § 8, cl. 3, does
not grant Congress the power to abrogate
state sovereign immunity. See Seminole
Tribe, 517 U.S. at 47. The Court in
Seminole Tribe first ruled that Congress had
adequately expressed its intent to abrogate
the states' immunity from suit. See id at
56. In the second part of its inquiry,
however, the Court ruled that in attempting
to abrogate state sovereign immunity,
Congress had exceeded its constitutional
power. Looking to The Federalist and other
statements of the Framers, the Court
determined that state sovereign immunity
was an essential element of the
Constitution's original structure. See id. at
69-71. Accordingly, the Court held that "the
Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial
power under Article III, and Article I cannot
be used to circumvent the constitutional
limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction."
Id. at 72-73. The Court applied a similar
two-step, historical analysis in Alden v.
Maine, 527 US. 706, 144 L. Ed 2d 636, 119
S, Ct. 2240 (1999), wherein it extended
Seminole Tribe to limit Congress's powers
with respect to suits in state court as well.
Five circuit courts have concluded that
under Seminole Tribe, Congress may not
validly abrogate state sovereign immunity
relying on its Bankruptcy Clause powers.
These circuits have relied primarily on
Seminole Tribe's broad language barring
Congress from abrogating state sovereign
immunity pursuant to its Article I powers.
However, neither Seminole Tribe nor any of
the Supreme Court's other recent sovereign
immunity cases address Congress's
Bankruptcy Clause powers as understood in
the plan of the Convention. We engage in
the Seminole Tribe analysis, and we
conclude that the text of the Constitution
and other evidence of the Framers' intent
demonstrate that under the Bankruptcy
Clause of Article I, section 8, Congress has
the power to abrogate state sovereign
immunity.
The Seminole Tribe inquiry must proceed in
two parts. First, the Supreme Court requires
that "to abrogate the States' Eleventh
Amendment immunity from suit in federal
court . .. Congress must make its intention
'unmistakably clear in the language of the
statute.'' There is no question here that
Congress has done so. Section 106(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code states that,
"notwithstanding an assertion of sovereign
immunity, sovereign immunity is abrogated
as to a governmental unit to the extent set
forth in this section with respect to . . .
[section] 523." 11 U.S.C. § 106(a)(1).
Subsection (a)(2) then sets forth the degree
to which sovereign immunity is abrogated
for actions involving § 523: "The court may
hear and determine any issue arising with
respect to the application of such sections to
governmental units." 11 U.S.C. § 106(a)(2).
This is "a clear legislative statement."
Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501
U.S. 775, 786, 115 L. Ed. 2d 686,- Il S. Ct.
2578 (1991),
Second, and more difficult, is the question
whether Congress's attempt to abrogate state
sovereign immunity was pursuant to
sufficient authority. The statute at issue here
was adopted pursuant to Congress's power
under Article I, section 8 of the Constitution
"to establish . . . uniform Laws on the
subject of Bankruptcies throughout the
United States." If Congress cannot abrogate
sovereign immunity under this provision, the
statute is invalid and Hood's suit is barred.
The Supreme Court has instructed that,
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when determining whether Congress may
abrogate state sovereign immunity, courts
are to look at the original structure of the
Constitution. See Alden, 527 U.S at 713
("Immunity from suit is a fundamental
aspect of the sovereignty which the States
enjoyed before the ratification of the
Constitution, and which they retain today . .
. except as altered by the plan of the
Convention or certain constitutional
amendments."). The Eleventh Amendment
will neither undermine nor bolster any
conclusion regarding the purposes of the
Convention, because that amendment sought
only to restore, not change, the structure
established at the Convention that was
apparently distorted by the Supreme Court's
decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2
Dali.) 419, 1 L. Ed. 440, 2 Dal. 419 (1793).
Alden, 527 U.S. at 722-23.
2. The Constitution's Text
Beginning with the Constitution's text,
Article I gives Congress the power to make
"uniform" laws over only two issues:
bankruptcy and naturalization. Granting the
federal government the power to make
uniform laws is, at least to some extent,
inconsistent with states retaining the power
to make laws over that issue. The Supreme
Court noted the importance of the
uniformity provision early on:
The peculiar terms of the grant
certainly deserve notice.
Congress is not authorized
merely to pass laws, the
operation of which shall be
uniform, but to establish
uniform laws on the subject
throughout the United States.
This establishment of
uniformity is, perhaps,
incompatible with state
legislation, on that part of the
subject to which the acts of
congress may extend.
Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 122, 193-94, 4 L. Ed 529 (1819).
It is worth discussing what the uniformity
provision is not. The "uniformity" provision
is not, as the Fifth Circuit suggests in In re
Fernandez, "'a requirement of geographic
uniformity' and nothing more." In re
Fernandez, 123 F.3d at 244 (quoting
Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v.
Green, 329 US. 156, 172, 91 L. Ed. 162, 67
S. Ct. 237 (1946) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring)). As an initial matter, this
language from Justice Frankfurter's
concurring opinion in Vanston was
inconsistent with the majority opinion in that
case. Justice Frankfurter reasoned in
Vanston that the creditors' claim was invalid
under state law, so there was nothing for the
bankruptcy court to enforce; as long
Congress treated all claims created under
state law uniformly, regardless of the state,
the uniformity requirement had been
satisfied. See Vanston, 329 US. at 172-73
(Frankfurter, J., concurring). However, the
majority in Vanston found no reason to
inquire whether state law had created any
valid claim, because the asserted claim was
inconsistent with federal bankruptcy policies
and thus could not be asserted-regardless
of its status under state law. See Vanston,
329 U.S. at 163-64. On the majority's
reasoning, federal courts must do more than
treat state laws uniformly; federal courts
must enforce federal bankruptcy law. If
Vanston is any guide as to what uniformity
requires, then uniformity requires much
more than Justice Frankfurter's concurrence
suggests.
Nor, as the following discussion
demonstrates, does Article I, section 8
reflect a mere congressional policy favoring
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uniformity across state borders. Unlike
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education
Expense Board v. College Savings Bank,
527 US 627, 144 L. Ed. 2d 575, 119 S. Ct.
2199 (1999), in which the Supreme Court
found that a legislative preference for
uniformity could not override a
constitutional prohibition on the abrogation
of state sovereign immunity, id. at 645, this
case involves the question whether a
constitutional uniformity requirement itself
authorizes Congress to abrogate state
sovereign immunity.
3. The Framers' Understanding of the
Bankruptcy Power
As it was initially understood, the
Bankruptcy Clause represented the states'
total grant of their power to legislate on
bankruptcy. In order for laws to be uniform,
the laws must be the same everywhere. That
uniformity would be unattainable if states
could pass their own laws. Alexander
Hamilton stated that the federal government
had "exclusive jurisdiction" where the
Constitution granted Congress the power to
make uniform laws. "This must necessarily
be exclusive; because if each State had
power to prescribe a DISTINCT RULE,
there could be no UNIFORM RULE." The
Federalist No. 32, at 155 (Alexander
Hamilton) (George W. Carey & James
McClellan eds., 2001). The earliest cases
similarly interpreted the grant of power as
exclusive, noting that laws could be uniform
only if a single agent were issuing them.
Associate Justice Bushrod Washington,
sitting as Circuit Justice, reasoned this way
in Golden v. Prince, 3 Wash. C. C. 313, 10
F Cas. 542, F. Cas. No. 5509 (C.C.D. Pa.
1814), writing, "That the exercise of the
power to pass bankrupt and naturalization
laws by the state governments, is
incompatible with the grant of a power to
congress to pass uniform laws on the same
subjects, is obvious, from the consideration
that the former would be dissimilar and
frequently contradictory; whereas the
systems are directed to be uniform, which
can only be rendered so by the exclusive
power in one body to form them." Id. at 545.
The authority was understood to be
exclusive because any lesser grant would
have defeated the grant's original purpose.
The bankruptcy system before 1789 was
marked by chaos. Because each state had
different laws, the discharge of a
Pennsylvanian's debts might have no effect
on his debts in Maryland, and the interests
of out-of-state creditors could be
subordinated to in-state creditors. This
system was not only ineffective, in that it
did not allow debtors the fresh start that
bankruptcy policies seek, but also ripe for
manipulation, in that it would give the
Pennsylvania creditor an incentive to assign
his interest in the debtor's estate to someone
in Maryland, making the debtor no better off
after bankruptcy than before. However, the
justification for the grant of exclusivity was
not a mere desire to have one system, but a
system that rose above individual states'
interests. As Joseph Story noted, there were
fears that each state would frame a
bankruptcy system that "best suits its own
local interests, and pursuits" or that was
marked "by undue domestic preferences and
favours." 3 Joseph Story, Commentaries on
the Constitution § § 1102, 1104 (1833), in
The Founders' Constitution (Philip B.
Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
Indeed, setting bankruptcy policies on the
state level would enable states to favor in-
state creditors over similarly-situated out-of-
state creditors. By granting the power to
Congress exclusively, the Constitution
prevented runaway states from defeating
bankruptcy's goals.
Although this understanding that the federal
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power was exclusive eventually gave way to
an acceptance that states could, in the
absence of federal legislation, pass laws on
bankruptcy, this development in no way
undermines the understanding at the time of
the Convention that the grant was exclusive.
Congress did not pass its first bankruptcy act
until 1800, repealed it in 1803, and was
unable to enact further legislation until
1841. See David A. Skeel, Jr., Debt's
Dominion: A History of Bankruptcy Law in
America 25 (2001). In the absence of a
federal bankruptcy code, states were forced
to rely on their own structures, and in 1819
the Supreme Court in Sturges v.
Crowninshield, 17 US. (4 Wheat.) 122, 4 L
Ed. 529 (1819), ruled that the Bankruptcy
Clause prohibited states from acting only
where Congress had already acted. Id. at
193-96. However, the Sturges non-
exclusivity interpretation was based less on
the original understanding of the Convention
than on the necessity of having some system
in place when Congress could not enact
bankruptcy legislation....
4. The States' Ceding of Sovereign
Immunity
Of course, it is possible that in ceding some
sovereignty with the Bankruptcy Clause, the
states ceded their legislative powers but not
their immunity from suit. As the amici
states point out, early Supreme Court
decisions that limited states' powers to
legislate did not receive the same hostile
reception that the Court's decision in
Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (Dall. 419)
(1793), which undermined state sovereign
immunity, received. This could suggest that
the power to legislate and the immunity
from suit were distinct aspects of
sovereignty in the early Americans' minds,
and that the decision to cede one aspect to
the federal government does not by itself
imply a surrender of the other.
The Federalist suggests that the states shed
their immunity from suit along with their
power to legislate together when the states
agreed to the Bankruptcy Clause's
uniformity provision. Two passages are
relevant. In The Federalist No. 81,
Hamilton discussed sovereign immunity as
follows.
It is inherent in the nature of
sovereignty, not to be amenable
to the suit of an individual
without its consent. This is the
general sense, and the general
practice of mankind; and the
exemption, as one of the
attributes of sovereignty, is now
enjoyed by the government of
every state in the union.
Unless, therefore, there is a
surrender of this immunity in
the plan of the convention, it
will remain with the states, and
the danger intimated must be
merely ideal. The circumstances
which are necessary to produce
an alienation of state
sovereignty, were discussed in
considering the article of
taxation, and need not be
repeated here.
The Federalist No. 81, at 422 (Alexander
Hamilton). The article on taxation, to which
Hamilton refers as identifying the
circumstances in which states can be said to
"alienate" their sovereignty, is The
Federalist No. 32.
As the plan of the convention
aims only at a partial union or
consolidation, the state
governments would clearly
retain all the rights of
sovereignty which they before
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had, and which were not, by
that act, exclusively delegated to
the United States. This
exclusive delegation, or rather
this alienation of state
sovereignty, would only exist in
three cases: where the
constitution in express terms
granted an exclusive authority
to the union; where it granted,
in one instance, an authority to
the union, and in another,
prohibited the states from
exercising the like authority;
and where it granted an
authority to the union, to which
a similar authority in the states
would be absolutely and totally
contradictory and repugnant.
The Federalist No. 32, at 155 (Alexander
Hamilton). ...
The question is whether Hamilton's
identification of the uniform powers as
examples of categories in which states have
ceded sovereignty includes the ceding of
immunity from suit. We conclude that No.
32 does in fact refer to the ceding of
sovereign immunity. Hamilton's cross-
reference to this discussion in No. 81's
discussion of ceding sovereign immunity
can only suggest that, in the minds of the
Framers, ceding sovereignty by the methods
described in No. 32 implies ceding
sovereign immunity as discussed in No. 81.
There is no other explanation for his cross-
reference in No. 81. Thus The Federalist No.
81 and No. 32 suggest that the states ceded
their immunity by granting Congress the
power to make uniform laws.
5. The Ratification Debates
Contrary to the amici states' suggestion, this
interpretation is consistent with the
ratification debates. First, although amici
are correct that those debating the proposed
Constitution's merits objected to certain suits
against the states, amici point to no such
objection specifically targeted against
enforcing federal bankruptcy laws against
the states. Rather, the bulk of the speakers
objected to Article III, section 2, which
allows suits between a state and citizens of
another state. See, e.g., 3 Elliot's Debates
533 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836)
(statement of James Madison); id. at 543
(statement of Patrick Henry); id at 555-56
(statement of John Marshall); see also id. at
527 (statement of George Mason) (objecting
to federal jurisdiction over suits between
state and foreign state, citizens, or subjects),
Although the debaters' relative silence over
sovereign immunity and the bankruptcy
provision does not necessarily indicate their
acquiescence, it does undermine the notion
that those ratifying the constitution objected
to federal jurisdiction over the states in such
cases.
The amici states also cite the New York and
Rhode Island conventions as conditioning
ratification on an understanding that private
persons could not sue the states. Like the
ratification debates, the ratification
resolutions are ambiguous on this front....
Those engaging in the state ratification
debates were meticulous in raising their
objections clause-by-clause, see, e.g., 3
Elliot's Debates 543 (statement of Patrick
Henry) ("No objection is made to [federal
courts'] cognizance of disputes between
citizens of the same state."), but none of the
debaters objected to subjecting the states to
federal suits in bankruptcy. This lack of
recorded opposition puts suits in bankruptcy
against the states in the same category with
other constitutionally-approved limits on
sovereign immunity, such as the provisions
subjecting states to suit by the federal
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government, for example, or to suits
between the states. See, e.g., United States
v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 639-40., 36 L. Ed.
285, 12 S. Ct. 488 (1892); 3 Elliot's Debates
549 (statement of Edmund Pendleton)[.] So
although the lack of expressed opposition
could reflect a gap in an otherwise careful
debate, it could also reflect the ratifiers'
acceptance that because a federal
bankruptcy system could cure the previous
systems' ills only if it applied uniformly to
all creditors and debtors, the Bankruptcy
Clause must grant Congress the power to
abrogate the states' sovereign immunity.
III. CONCLUSION
Much of the evidence regarding the plan of
the Convention is ambiguous. However, the
Supreme Court has made clear that the best
evidence of the Framers' intentions on state
sovereignty comes from the text of the
Constitution and The Federalist. See, e.g.,
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 918-
21, 138 L. Ed. 2d 914, 117 S. Ct. 2365
(1997). Indeed, Seminole Tribe itself relies
heavily on The Federalist No. 81. See
Seminole Tribe, 517 US. at 54, 69, 70 n.13.
Here, the Constitution's text and Hamilton's
reference in The Federalist No. 81 to the
means of abrogating sovereignty in The
Federalist No. 32 suggest that, with the
Bankruptcy Clause, the states granted
Congress the power to abrogate state
sovereign immunity. The states' immunity
was thus "altered by the plan of the
Convention." Alden, 527 U.S. at 713.
Congress clearly exercised that power in 11
US.C. § 106(a). Accordingly, TSAC is not
immune from suit under 11 U.S.C. §
523(a)(8).
This conclusion in no way undermines the
dignity of the state as a separate sovereign.
This is not an instance in which Congress
has enabled private parties to "haul" states
into court against their will, see Federal
Mar. Comm'n v. South Carolina State Ports
Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 122 S. Ct. 1864, 1874
n.11, 152 L. Ed. 2d 962 (2002), but an
instance in which Congress has granted
states precisely the protection that they
sought. Unlike a traditional lawsuit, in
which a state is forced to defend itself
against an accusation of wrongdoing, the
bankruptcy process "is, shortly speaking, an
adjudication of interests claimed in a res."
Gardner, 329 US. at 574. If the state
wishes to assert its interest in the res, it may
do so. If it prefers not to, it may decline,
and the debtor will still need to convince the
bankruptcy court that repayment will
constitute an "undue hardship." See 11
US.C. § 523(a).
At the Constitutional Convention, the states
granted Congress the power to abrogate their
sovereign immunity under Article I, section
8. In 11 U.S.C. § 106(a), Congress used that
power to grant states a benefit they had
sought. We AFFIRM the denial of TSAC's
motion to dismiss and REMAND to the
bankruptcy court for further proceedings.
CONCUR:
KENNEDY, Circuit Judge, concurring.
Because I conclude that TSAC has waived
its sovereign immunity by filing a claim, I
concur with the majority of the panel that
the bankruptcy court has jurisdiction to hear
this adversary proceeding. I cannot join the
panel's opinion and I thus concur in the
judgment only.
It is well-established that when a state files a
proof of claim in a bankruptcy adjudication,
"it waives any immunity it otherwise might
have had respecting the adjudication of the
claim." Gardner v. New Jersey, 329 US.
565, 91 L. Ed. 504, 67 S. Ct. 467 (1947).
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On November 15, 1999, an authorized agent
of Sallie Mae Servicing Corporation, the
original holder of Hood's student loan debt,
signed an assignment of proof of claim form
transferring the debt to TSAC. The actual
proof of claim was filed by Sallie Mae in the
bankruptcy court on November 29, 1999.
The assignment of that proof of claim form
was filed one month later, on December 20,
1999. The assignment was effectuated with
notice to TSAC and without objection from
any party. Although there is no claims
docket or claims register in the record, that
is only because it is standard practice in that
district not to have a claims docket or claims
register in a no-asset Chapter 7 bankruptcy
and it does not change the fact that a proof
of claim was filed.
TSAC's first argument that it was Sallie
Mae-not the state-who filed the proof of
claim, and Sallie Mae does not have the
authority to waive Tennessee's sovereign
immunity. Although Sallie Mae filed the
proof of claim, it was a proof of claim on a
debt owned by TSAC. TSAC had
voluntarily undertaken to guarantee Hood's
student loans, and accepted assignment of
the debt from Sallie Mae. The assignment
was made before the filing of the claim.
Under these circumstances, I think it is clear
that TSAC voluntarily invoked the federal
bankruptcy court's jurisdiction and waived
its sovereign immunity.
TSAC's second argument (in the alternative)
is that filing a proof of claim only
constitutes waiver of its immunity from
jurisdiction over the normal bankruptcy
adjudication, but not for an "undue
hardship" proceeding under 11 US C. §
523(a)(8). Although the Supreme Court's
decision in Gardner v. New Jersey clearly
holds that filing a proof of claim waives a
state creditor's sovereign immunity with
respect to normal discharge proceedings,
TSAC argues that the adversarial proceeding
required by federal bankruptcy regulations is
separate and distinct from the normal
bankruptcy discharge proceeding.
I disagree. The determination of "undue
hardship" is inextricably interrelated with
the normal discharge proceeding such that
the waiver of sovereign immunity in one
extends to the other. As the Eighth Circuit
noted in In re Rose, "the text of the
bankruptcy code makes clear that these
procedures are both part of a larger whole;
the same section that exempts educational
debt from a general discharge establishes the
ground of undue hardship as the exception
to the exemption." 187 F.3d at 930. The
structure of the statutory provision reveals
that "undue hardship" is a defense-indeed,
the only defense-to the state's general
privilege of exempting student loans from
normal bankruptcy discharge proceedings.
Moreover, in filing a proof of claim, TSAC
attempted to take advantage of the federal
bankruptcy court's power to exempt student
loans from general discharge proceedings.
Further, if there had been assets in the estate,
TSAC could have shared in those assets.
Having attempted to benefit from the powers
of the federal bankruptcy court, it must,
therefore, accept the court's power to decide
whether the hardship exception protects
Hood from the general student loan
exemption. See New York v. Irving Trust
Co., 288 US. 329, 332, 77 L. Ed. 815, 53 S.
Ct. 389 (1933) ("If a state desires to
participate in the assets of a bankrupt, she
must submit to the appropriate requirements
by the controlling power.").
Although I agree with the majority that we
should not normally reach issues not raised
before the bankruptcy court, we have
recognized certain exceptions to that rule.
In Pinney Dock and Transport Co. v. Penn
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Central Corp., 838 F.2d 1445, 1461 (6th
Cir. 1988), we held that we may reach an
issue if it "is presented with sufficient clarity
and completeness" for the court to resolve
the issue. The Supreme Court has held that
the decision to deviate from the general rule
is a matter "left primarily to the discretion of
the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the
facts of individual cases." Singleton v.
Wulff 428 U.S. 106, 121, 49 L. Ed 2d 826,
96 S. Ct. 2868 (1976). Moreover, the
Supreme Court has long recognized that we
should not decide constitutional questions
when their resolution is unnecessary to the
outcome of the case. While the issue of
waiver was not raised in the bankruptcy
court, the facts with respect to the filing of
the claim are not in dispute, and the
documents relied upon to establish those
facts are from the bankruptcy court's
records. In this case, the waiver question is
presented with sufficient clarity and
completeness to resolve the issues before
this court without having to reach the
complex constitutional questions raised by
the parties.
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"Justices to Rule on Immunity of States in Bankruptcy Suits"
New York Times
October 1, 2003
Linda Greenhouse
The Supreme Court added a significant new
federalism case to its docket for the new
term on Tuesday, accepting an appeal filed
by the State of Tennessee on whether states
are immune from suit under federal
bankruptcy law.
States are often brought into federal court in
bankruptcy proceedings, not because they
themselves are bankrupt but because they
are creditors. Most of the 1.5 million people
who file for bankruptcy every year owe
debts to an agency of state government and
seek relief from the obligation to repay those
debts, so the case has a highly practical
dimension as well as implications for the
Supreme Court's continuing reexamination
of the balance of power between the federal
government and the states.
The underlying dispute in the new case, an
effort by a woman who filed for bankruptcy
to be freed of the obligation to repay her
student loans, is fairly typical of the ways
that states find themselves embroiled in
bankruptcy proceedings. Under federal law,
student loans that are guaranteed by
governmental agencies, as many are, are not
treated as ordinary debts that can be wiped
away in bankruptcy proceedings. Instead,
the law requires proof that repaying the loan
would produce "an undue hardship."
After receiving relief from her other debts in
a bankruptcy filing in 1999, Pamela L. Hood
went back to federal bankruptcy court to
establish her entitlement to a "hardship
discharge" of the $4,169.13 she owed to the
Tennessee Student Assistance Corporation,
a state agency that had guaranteed her loan.
To accomplish that, she had to name the
state agency as a defendant in a federal
lawsuit. But Tennessee refused to take part
in the proceeding, arguing that it was
protected by sovereign immunity from the
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court.
Both the bankruptcy court and the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit, which sits in Cincinnati, rejected the
state's position, in contrast to several other
federal appeals courts that have interpreted
the Supreme Court's recent rulings on state
immunity as extending to bankruptcy
proceedings as well.
In its current form, this debate began in
1996, when the Supreme Court ruled in
Seminole Tribe v. Florida that Congress
lacked the constitutional power to authorize
suits by Indian tribes against the states. The
majority's theory in that 5-to-4 decision was
that the 11th Amendment, which deprives
the federal courts of jurisdiction to hear
certain suits against states, trumped Article I
of the Constitution, which enumerates
specific Congressional powers, like the
power to regulate interstate commerce.
In a dissenting opinion in the Seminole Tribe
case, Justice John Paul Stevens warned that
the majority's theory would disable
Congress from enforcing federal
bankruptcy, copyright and antitrust laws
against the states. Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist, the majority opinion's author,
took issue with that warning, responding in a
footnote that Justice Stevens's "conclusion is
exaggerated both in its substance and in its
significance." Since then, the bankruptcy
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question has produced considerable debate,
and it appeared unlikely that the court would
be able to avoid confronting it directly.
In this case, Tennessee Student Assistance
Corporation v. Hood, No. 02-1606, a group
of leading bankruptcy scholars who oppose
Tennessee's position nonetheless filed a
brief urging the justices to hear the state's
appeal in order to resolve the issue.
"Assertion of state sovereign immunity is
now commonplace in bankruptcy cases and
has an enormous impact on the bankruptcy
system, debtors, and creditors," the scholars'
brief said.
A brief filed on Tennessee's behalf by 48 of
the other 49 states-all but New Jersey-
said that what was at issue was "a state's
ability to control its fisc." There was
nothing special about bankruptcy, the states
said, that would deprive states of the
immunity they enjoyed from laws enacted
under the other Congressional powers
conveyed by Article I of the Constitution.
In rejecting Tennessee's immunity claim,
however, the Sixth Circuit concluded that
bankruptcy was in fact special in important
respects. The court said that the
Constitution's framers thought it was
essential to have uniform bankruptcy rules
apply on a national level so that states would
not set up their own systems to favor in-state
creditors. The states understood this, the
court said, and knowingly gave up an aspect
of their sovereignty when they agreed to
ratify a Constitution that gave Congress the
power to establish "uniform laws on the
subject of bankruptcies throughout the
United States."
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"Supreme Court Will Hear Virginia Case Regarding
State Immunity from Bankruptcy"
News and Advance
April 6, 2005
Matt Busse
Apr. 6-The U.S. Supreme Court agreed
Monday to hear a case involving Central
Virginia Community College and three other
state colleges that could ultimately decide
whether states are immune from bankruptcy
proceedings.
The case, Central Virginia Community
College v. Katz, stems from the 2001
bankruptcy of Lexington, Ky.-based
Wallace's Bookstores Inc., which was
founded by former Kentucky Gov. Wallace
Wilkinson and operated stores at the
schools.
In 2003, Bernard Katz, the liquidating
supervisor in charge of paying off the
company's creditors, sued the colleges,
seeking more than $400,000 he claimed they
owed Wallace's plus interest and fees,
according to documents filed in Kentucky
bankruptcy court.
The colleges asked the bankruptcy court to
dismiss the case, saying the U.S.
Constitution's 11th Amendment renders
states-and state-run colleges-immune
from bankruptcy proceedings.
Higher courts rejected the colleges' request,
citing a 1994 provision in bankruptcy law
passed by the U.S. Congress that they said
lifted the states' immunities.
"It's an issue that's enormously important to
the states," said William Thro, Virginia's
solicitor general, who represents the schools
in the case. "What we're talking about here
is basically them wanting to get money from
the state treasury."
Wallace's Bookstores operated a location at
Central Virginia Community College from
1998 until the book company filed for
bankruptcy in 2001. It has since been
replaced by Barnes & Noble.
Wilkinson filed for personal bankruptcy in
2001 as well. His debts totaled $418.4
million while his company's debts totaled
$152.3 million, according to The Lexington
Herald-Leader.
Wilkinson told creditors in 2001 that before
Wallace's filed for bankruptcy protection,
the chain was worth as much as $450
million and operated 90 locations in about
25 states, according to The Cincinnati
Enquirer.
The three Virginia colleges involved in the
Supreme Court case besides CVCC are
Virginia Military Institute, New River
Community College and Blue Ridge
Community College.
When Katz sued the four colleges in 2003,
the suit claimed the schools owed Wallace's
money for unsold books and from
"preferential transfers."
Preferential transfers occur when a company
pays off some creditors but not others
shortly before it declares bankruptcy.
In this case, Wallace's Bookstores paid off
some of its debts to the colleges but didn't
pay debts to some other creditors, said
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Anthony Sammons, an attorney with the law
firm Dinsmore and Shohl, LLP, which
represents Katz.
Because of bankruptcy laws regarding
preferential transfers, that money should
have been distributed among all of the book
chain's creditors instead, Sammons said.
Therefore, Katz sued the schools, seeking to
reclaim the "preferential transfer" money
paid to the colleges as well as money owed
to the company from unsold goods.
"That would be $400,000 that could be
better spent on roads, or health care, or
education or at these various colleges to help
these individual students," Thro, the state
solicitor general, said.
The bankruptcy court and later the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit, which
covers cases in Kentucky where Katz filed
suit, rejected the colleges' argument that
states are immune from bankruptcy
proceedings.
The country's 49 other states have
collectively filed a "friend of the court" brief
with the Supreme Court supporting
Virginia's appeal to the Supreme Court.
Now, the essential issue the Supreme Court
must decide is whether states are, in fact,
immune from bankruptcy proceedings and
whether Congress acted within its authority
when it amended the bankruptcy code,
The court will begin hearing arguments in
October.
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"Wallace's Goes to Supreme Court"
Daily Deal/The Deal
April 13, 2005
Terry Brennan
The U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to take
up the issue of whether state governments are
immune from federal bankruptcy proceedings.
The court will hear arguments in the fall over
whether liquidating Wallace's Bookstores Inc.
has the right to sue four state-run Virginia
colleges.
The four universities petitioned the court to
block Wallace's Bookstores from suing them
for more than $400,000 as part of its Chapter
7 liquidation.
Wallace's sued the four schools in an effort to
collect preference payments, said the
liquidating trustee in the case, Bernard Katz
of J.H. Cohn LLP in Edison, N.J.
The payments were made to the four colleges
because they were the landlords for Wallace's
stores on their campuses. The payments were
made within 90 days of the company's
bankruptcy filing, making them preference
payments.
But Katz feels the matter could have wider
repercussions. "This case could well extend
beyond preference transfers to the issue of
what rights states have to protect themselves
from actions in federal bankruptcies," he said.
The court agreed to hear Central Virginia
Community College v. Katz to resolve a
conflict in the federal circuit appellate courts
over the issue of sovereign immunity of the
states in bankruptcy proceedings, said Jeffrey
Morris, the resident scholar at the American
Bankruptcy Institute.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit
last month upheld Wallace's right to sue the
state-run schools in an attempt to collect the
preference payments, he said.
"It's a constitutional issue of whether the
states waived their sovereign immunity when
they ceded to Congress the authority to make
uniform federal laws on bankruptcy," Morris
said. "This could have a major impact
because the question becomes whether states
are permitted to operate outside the realm of
standard debtor-creditor relationships."
A ruling upholding Wallace's ability to sue
could have a huge impact on recoveries of
preference transfers that extend to state-
related claims such as workers' compensation,
said debtor counsel, Kim Martin Lewis of
Dinsmore & Shohl LLP in Cincinnati. "It
could have a great impact, particularly on
large Chapter 11 and even Chapter 7 cases, if
the states are held to be immune from
preference lawsuits."
The Kentucky bankruptcy court supported
Wallace's right to sue, as did the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky and
the 6th Circuit Appeals Court, which both
rejected the colleges' appeal on the grounds of
sovereign immunity. The colleges are
arguing that the 11th amendment to the U.S.
Constitution grants them immunity from
bankruptcy proceedings.
The Wallace's estate, meanwhile, argues that
Section 106 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code
gives debtors the right to sue states as part of
their petitions.
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The Supreme Court had agreed to hear a
similar case in its last session in an attempt to
resolve the conflict of states' rights vis-a-vis
the federal bankruptcy code.
The court bypassed the issue, however, when
it ruled 7-2 that Pamela Hood's attempt to
discharge her student loan with the Tennessee
Student Assistance Corp. was not a lawsuit, as
TSAC argued, and thus didn't involve the
I Ith amendment.
The colleges, Central Virginia Community
College, Virginia Military Institute, New
River Community College and Blue Ridge
Community College, owe the Wallace's estate
for payments they received, which were
primarily for unsold books, Katz said.
The remaining 49 states have collectively
filed friend-of-the-court briefs in support of
Virginia's appeal.
The case is due to be heard when the court's
next session begins in October.
Thomas Wilkinson launched Wallace's
Bookstores with a single outlet at the
University of Kentucky in Lexington in 1962.
The business grew into a national network of
92 college bookstores by the time it filed for
Chapter 11 protection on Feb. 28, 2001, with
the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern
District of Kentucky in Lexington.
In the interim, Wilkinson served as
Kentucky's governor and was able to parlay
his political clout to attract several high-
spending investors.
Wendy's International Inc. founder R. David
Thomas, for instance, filed a $54 million
claim after Wilkinson's empire collapsed in an
alleged Ponzi scheme.
Only one major claim has yet to be resolved
in the wind-down of Wallace's 4-year-old
liquidation, Katz said. That involves a $5
million claim filed by L. Rogers Wells,
Wilkinson's finance secretary during his 1987
to 1991 tenure as governor, Katz said.
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"Tenn. Student v. Hood, 124 S. Ct. 1905"
National Law Journal
August 2, 2004
In a 7-2 decision, the court held that because
discharge of student loan liability does not
implicate the state's 11th Amendment
immunity, the justices need not address the
certiorari question of whether Congress has
the authority to abrogate sovereign
immunity through the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code. Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v.
Hood, No. 02-1606.
After getting a Chapter 7 discharge, Pamela
Hood petitioned the bankruptcy court to
reopen her case so that she could add the
Tennessee state agency servicing her student
loans as a creditor, and commence a
discharge-for-undue-hardship proceeding
against it. The bankruptcy court denied the
agency's motion to dismiss. The 6th Circuit
ruled that the U.S. Constitution's bankruptcy
clause gave Congress the right to abrogate
the states' sovereign immunity.
The justices said that because the
bankruptcy court's authority is derived from
the debtor, an exercise of the court's in rem
jurisdiction to discharge a student loan is not
a suit against the state for 11th Amendment
purposes. Rehnquist's opinion was joined by
Stevens, O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter,
Ginsburg and Breyer. Thomas, joined by
Scalia, dissented.
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United States v. Georgia
(04-1203)
Ruling Below: (Goodman v. Ray, 120 Fed.Appx. 785 (11th Cir.(Ga.) Sept. 16, 2004) available
in Appendix A to petition for cert. No. 04-1203 at
http://www.usdoj.gov/osg/briefs/2004/2pet/7pet/2004-1203.pet.aa.pdf (last visited June 13,
2005), cert. granted, US. v. Georgia, 125 S.Ct. 2256, 73 U.S.L.W. 3671 (U.S. May 16, 2005)
(No. 04-1203) AND cert. granted by Goodman v. Georgia, 125 S.Ct. 2266, 73 U.S.L.W. 3671
(U.S. May 16, 2005) (No. 04-1203)).
Tony Goodman, a state prisoner in Georgia, brought suit against the state and various prison
officials for violations of his rights under the Eighth Amendment and Title II of the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA). Goodman is a paraplegic and is bound to a wheelchair. He claims
that the prison is inadequately designed for such a disability, resulting in numerous health and
safety problems, stemming largely from his inability to use a toilet or shower without the
assistance he claims is often withheld. The District Court granted defendants' joint motion for
summary judgment, finding that claims for damages were prohibited by the Eleventh
Amendment. The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The United States
intervened in the case in order to support Goodman's right to sue under the ADA. As a result,
there were two separate petitions for certiorari, one from Goodman (Goodman v. Georgia) and
one from the United States (US. v Georgia). The cases have been consolidated by the Supreme
Court.
Questions Presented:
Goodman v. Georgia: Whether, and to what extent, Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12131 et seq., validly abrogates state sovereign
immunity for suits by prisoners with disabilities challenging discrimination by state-
operated prisons, a question on which the courts of appeals are in conflict.
U.S. v. Georgia: Whether Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42
U.S.C. 12131 to 12165, is a proper exercise of Congress's power under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment, as applied to the administration of prison systems.
NOTE: Much of the analysis that will be at issue before the Supreme Court in US. v. Georgia
was incorporated into Goodman v. Ray by reference to Miller v. King, 384 F.3d 1248 (2004), a
similar case decided by the Eleventh Circuit a few days before Goodman. The relevant portions
of Miller are excerpted following Goodman v. Ray (pages 279 - 282).
Tony GOODMAN, Plaintiff-Appellant
V.
O.T. RAY, ET AL., Defendants
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United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit
Decided: September 16, 2004
[Excerpt: some footnotes and citations omitted]
HULL, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff Tony Goodman, a paraplegic state
prisoner, appeals (1) the dismissal of his
Eighth-Amendment claims brought under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, and (2) the grant of summary
judgment on his disability-discrimination
claims brought under Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12131, et seq. ("ADA").
After review and oral argument, we: (1)
reverse, in part, the district court's dismissal
of Goodman's Eighth-Amendment claims
for monetary and injunctive relief under §
1983; (2) reverse the magistrate judge's
grant of summary judgment for the
defendants on Goodman's ADA claims for
injunctive relief; and (3) affirm the grant of
summary judgment for all defendants with
regard to Goodman's ADA claims for
monetary damages under Title II of the
ADA. We further order that Goodman be
allowed an opportunity to amend and
streamline his complaint as to his Eighth-
Amendment claims and his ADA claims
under Title 1I for injunctive relief.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
According to the medical evidence in the
record, Goodman was involved in an
automobile accident in 1992, which left him
unable to walk. Goodman is a wheelchair-
dependent paraplegic, whose injuries
include multiple spinal fractures.
In 1995, Goodman was convicted of
aggravated assault, possession of a firearm
by a convicted felon, and possession of
cocaine with intent to distribute. On June
18, 1996, Goodman was transferred to
Georgia State Prison ("GSP"), in Reidsville,
Georgia. Goodman's complaint concerns
his stay at GSP.
A. Complaint
After filing numerous administrative
grievances with prison officials regarding
the conditions of confinement at GSP,
Goodman filed this federal suit claiming,
inter alia, violations of the Eighth
Amendment and Title II of the ADA.
Goodman's pro se complaint names the
following defendants: (1) the Georgia
Department of Corrections ("GDOC"); (2)
the State of Georgia, [and numerous
employees of the prison system, including
O.T. Ray, supervisor of guard shifts at
GSP.] . . . Goodman's complaint alleges,
inter alia, that the defendants, in their
individual and official capacities, were
deliberately indifferent to his (1) serious
medical needs and (2) conditions of
confinement at GSP, in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. Goodman sought
monetary damages.
Goodman further claims that the defendants
discriminated against him on the basis of his
disability in violation of Title II of the ADA.
Goodman sought both injunctive relief and
monetary damages on his ADA claims.
Because we are reviewing the dismissal of
Goodman's Eighth-Amendment claims, we
outline the factual allegations in his
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complaint, assuming all allegations to be
true. Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1357
(11th Cir. 2003) ("In reviewing a complaint,
we accept all well-pleaded factual
allegations as true and construe the facts in
the light most favorable to the plaintiff.").
B. Conditions at GSP
Goodman is housed in a high/maximum
security section of GSP, the K-Building.
Prison officials claim that Goodman "was
assigned to . . . the Special Management
Unit [K-Building] both because of his
continuous disruptive conduct and the
special requirements associated with his
being wheelchair bound."
Goodman is kept in his "K-1 unit" cell,
measuring twelve-feet long by three-feet
wide, for twenty-three to twenty-four hours
per day. While Goodman has had some
disciplinary problems in the past,
Goodman's allegations about the size of his
cell appear to be unrelated to disciplinary
issues. Instead, this is apparently the size of
his cell whether or not he is in disciplinary
isolation. According to Goodman, GSP
does not provide reasonable
accommodations for his paraplegia.
Specifically, Goodman claims that the
prison "lacks facilities for the disabled for
hygiene, drinking and performing body
excretion functions" and that GSP "is in a
serious state of disrepair and fail[s] to meet
minimal health and safety needs of the
Plaintiff."
Beyond the inadequate prison conditions,
Goodman claims that he has been denied
access to "services, programs, and
activities" at GSP by the defendants because
of his disability. Specifically, Goodman
states that the defendants have discriminated
against him, based on his disability, because
they have -refused and/or denied and/or
excluded him from participation in MH/MR
services, programs, and activities of the
prison."
Further, Goodman claims that he "could be
more appropriately treated in [a] more
integrated community setting," and that his
continued confinement in the "segregated
environment" is "unlawful disability-based
discrimination." In this regard, Goodman
also contends that the classification
procedures for the prison are inadequate
because "a substantial number of prisoner[s]
. . . are placed in maximum custody, when
lesser degrees of custody would suffice."
Goodman states that the classification
procedures are inadequate because "there
are insufficient staff members to give
adequate time to each case, and staff
members are inadequately trained."
Goodman provides numerous examples of
the manner in which the prison conditions at
GSP are inadequate for the disabled.
Specifically, Goodman claims that he is
unable to turn his wheelchair around inside
of his twelve-foot-by-three-foot cell, and,
thus is virtually immobile. Goodman also
alleges that he is unable to use his toilet, his
bed, or the shower without assistance, and
that the GSP prison officials or guards do
not provide him with assistance. In fact,
according to Goodman, he has been forced
to sit in his own bodily waste for long
periods of time because none of the guards
was willing to assist him.
In his complaint, Goodman also states that
he has suffered "long periods of deprivation
of basic amenities," such as "showers, baths,
adequate ventilation or heating, recreation,
work, medical and MH/MR care, laundry
service, cleaning service, and phone
service." Furthermore, Goodman states that
he does not have access to the windows of
his cell, the wall electrical plugs of his cell,
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and that GSP does not have wheelchair-
accessible routes or rooms throughout the
prison. Goodman also details the programs
he has been denied access to, including:
"counseling services, educational services,
college program, vocational training,
recreation activities, freedom of movement
in the unit and institution, television, phone
calls, entertainment, and religious rights."
C. Specific Instances of Injury
According to Goodman, there have been
instances in which he was injured trying to
use the toilet or the shower because the
toilets and the showers do not have supports
for disabled prisoners, and the prison staff
did not provide him the necessary
assistance. For example, Goodman states
that on August 26, 1998, he had to "hurl"
himself from his wheelchair onto the toilet,
and that the toilet seat was not stabilized or
secure. When he tried to return to his
wheelchair from the toilet, Goodman states
that he "slipped and fell onto the floor
causing an epileptic seizure, and . . . [he]
broke his right toe and crushed his right
knee."
Goodman claims that, on May 12, 1999, he
"had a [bowel movement] and urine, on
himself," and that he requested cleaning
supplies from "S.M.U. Capt. Mr. Brown,
Mr. Smith, and Mr. Hall," and assistance in
cleaning his wheelchair and cell, but all of
them refused. He states that he was "forced
to live in a cell where the floor was smeared
with defecation and urine. . . . He was
required to live and sit in his own body
waste," while being refused repeated
requests for cleaning supplies and
assistance.
Goodman claims that, on May 14, 1999, he
"broke his left foot and crushed his left
knee," while trying to transfer himself to the
toilet from his wheelchair. Goodman
alleges that Captain Brown denied his
requests for help cleaning his cell and for
medical care.
Goodman also describes how he was harmed
in the showering facility at GSP because it
was without adequate support for prisoners
with disabilities. On April 8, 1998,
Goodman states that "C.O. II Whimbly took
a toilet seat into the shower for the Plaintiff
to sit on while showering, but the toilet seat
is not accessible. Plaintiff was trying to
transfer from his [wheelchair] to the toilet
chair but the toilet seat turned over and he
fell to the floor and was hurt at [the] head,
neck, [and] left arm." Goodman also claims
that he was denied adequate medical care
following this incident.
Goodman further claims that the prison
officials have not taken appropriate
measures to safely transport inmates with
disabilities. Goodman describes one
occasion in which he was transferred from
GSP to the federal court building in Atlanta,
Georgia, in a vehicle that was not equipped
for wheelchair-bound passengers.
Specifically, Goodman states that on May 5,
1998, he was "forced to ride handcuffed and
shackled in the back of a van without
seatbelts or restraints," and that "the seat
which he was seated in was not stabiled [sic]
or secure." As a result, Goodman states that
he "fell to the floor and lost consciousness
several times," and that he "suffer[ed]
injures [sic] and pains at head, neck, back,
stomach and legs." Goodman also states
that upon his return, he made a request to
Officer Hays, and R. Smith "to see someone
from medical . . . but medical refused to see
or examine [him]."
With regard to these allegations, Goodman
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claims that GSP officials-Warden Sikes,
Deputy Warden Brady, Supervisor Ray, Dr.
Lowry, Dr. Mailloux, Barbara Werth, L.
Waters, J. Bradford, J. Paris, and Lynn 0.
Smith-"had knowledge and notice that
[Goodman] was not secured, safe or
stabilized in this cell," and that "despite this
knowledge of his precarious and perilous
placement within the prison cell the above
named agents proceeded to house him in a
prison cell which was in total disregard of
his health, safety and wellbeing."
D. Dismissal of Goodman § 1983 Claims
With respect to Goodman's ADA claims,
the magistrate judge stated that his suit
against GDOC is actually against both the
State of Georgia and the GDOC. The
magistrate judge pointed out that the ADA
applies to services, programs, and activities
of "a public entity," making the State of
Georgia a proper defendant for Goodman's
ADA claims. Thus,. the magistrate judge
recommended that the ADA claims be
allowed to proceed against the GDOC and
that the State of Georgia be joined as a
defendant.
Noting that the United States Supreme Court
had not addressed the question of whether
the application of the ADA to state prisons
was a constitutional exercise of
Congressional power under the Commerce
Clause or under the Fourteenth Amendment,
the magistrate judge determined that
Goodman's allegations "arguably stated a
colorable claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. §
12131."
On August 20, 1999, the district court, in a
one-page order, adopted the magistrate
judge's recommendations and . . . dismissed
the ADA claims against all defendants,
except for his ADA claims against
defendants the GDOC and the State of
Georgia. Goodman was not given an
opportunity to amend his complaint.
F. Summary Judgment on Goodman's ADA
Claims
Following the dismissal of Goodman's §
1983 claims, the parties filed cross motions
for summary judgment as to his ADA
claims....
... [T]he State of Georgia and the GDOC .
. [argued] that: (1) the State of Georgia had
immunity from his ADA claims for
monetary damages under the Eleventh
Amendment; (2) his ADA claims for
injunctive relief were moot; (3) the ADA did
not apply to state prisons; (4) his claims
failed on the merits; and (5) his claims were
foreclosed by the Prison Litigation Reform
Act ("PLRA").
On February 10, 2000, the magistrate judge
recommended that both motions be denied,
determining that: (1) states are not immune
to suit brought under the ADA; (2)
Goodman's claim for injunctive relief was
not moot despite his transfer; and (3) there
were issues of fact. The magistrate judge
identified the issues of fact, as follows: (1)
whether the defendants reasonably
accommodated Goodman's disability; (2)
whether Goodman was a "qualified
individual" under the ADA; and (3) whether
Goodman's claim for mental suffering was
foreclosed by the PLRA.
On March 6, 2000, the district court adopted
the magistrate judge's report and denied
Goodman's and the defendants' motions for
summary judgment. On June 14, 2001, the
parties consented to trial by the magistrate
judge. On October 22, 2001, the State of
Georgia and the GDOC again moved for
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summary judgment based on and due to the
then-new Supreme court decision in Board
of Trustees of the University of Alabama, et
al. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 121 S. Ct. 955
(2001).
On December 12, 2001, the magistrate judge
granted the State of Georgia and the
GDOC's joint motion for summary
judgment, determining that Goodman's
claims for monetary damages under the
ADA were precluded by the Eleventh
Amendment and that his claims for
injunctive relief were rendered moot due to
his transfer from GSP to Valdosta State
Prison.
Goodman appeals the district court's . . .
grant of summary judgment on his ADA
claims for monetary damages and injunctive
relief.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the grant of summary judgment
de novo, viewing all evidence and factual
inferences therefrom in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party.
Wascura v. City of South Miami, 257 F.3d
1238, 1242 (11th Cir. 2001).
IV. ADA CLAIM FOR INJUNCTIVE
RELIEF
We first affirm the magistrate judge's grant
of summary judgment to all the defendants
on Goodman's ADA claims for monetary
damages as barred by the Eleventh
Amendment. Miller v. King, No. 02-13348,
slip. op. at _. The magistrate judge,
however, erred in determining that
Goodman's ADA claims for injunctive relief
under Title II were moot for the following
reasons.
It is true that "[t]he general rule is that a
prisoner's transfer or release from a jail
moots his individual claim for declaratory
and injunctive relief," McKinnon v.
Talladega Co., 745 F.2d 1360, 1363 (11th
Cir. 1984) (citation omitted). The "capable
of repetition, yet evading review" doctrine
provides an exception to the general rule of
mootness. That doctrine requires "a
reasonable expectation that the same
complaining party would be subjected to the
same action again." Weinstein v. Bradford,
423 U.S. 147, 149, 96 S. Ct. 347, 349
(1975). In Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S.
395, 402-03, 95 S. Ct. 2330, 2334-35
(1975), the Supreme Court concluded that
the "capable of repetition, yet evading
review" doctrine would not apply in prison
transfer cases if the likelihood of re-transfer
was remote and speculative.
Since the filing of his lawsuit in 1999,
Goodman has been transferred nine times...
. [T]his Court continues to list Goodman's
address as GSP, given that we have received
status-report requests from Goodman at GSP
as recently as April 21, 2004.
What is certain is that Goodman is either at
GSP or the likelihood of his eventual
transfer back to GSP is far from remote or
speculative. Consequently, we conclude
that the "capable of repetition, yet evading
review" doctrine applies in this case and that
Goodman's claims for injunctive relief
under Title II of the ADA are not moot.
Therefore, this case is remanded to the
district court to consider Goodman's claims
for injunctive relief under Title 11 of the
ADA. Because Goodman is already
amending his complaint for the purposes of
his § 1983 action, Goodman may also take
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this opportunity to present a clearer picture
of his allegations for injunctive relief under
Title II of the ADA. See Miller, No. 02-
13348, slip op. at-(outlining the
requirements for stating a claim under Title
II of the ADA). Furthermore, the proper
defendants on Goodman's ADA claims for
injunctive relief should be Warden Sikes and
Commissioner Garner, in their official
capacities, not the State of Georgia or the
GDOC. See Miller, No. 02-13348, slip op.
at
V. CONCLUSION
With respect to Goodman's ADA claims, we
affirm the magistrate judge's grant of
summary judgment as to Goodman's claims
for monetary relief under Title II of the
ADA against all defendants, but vacate the
grant of summary judgment on Goodman's
claims for injunctive relief under Title II of
the ADA. The proper defendants on
Goodman's ADA claims for injunctive relief
are Warden Sikes and Commissioner Garner
(or the current Commissioner), in their
official capacities.
VACATED, REVERSED,
REMANDED, in part;
and
AFFIRMED, in part.
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Tracy MILLER, Plaintiff-Appellant, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Intervenor
V.
Donald KING, ET AL., Defendants
United States Court of Appeals
for the Eleventh Circuit
Decided September 14, 2004
384 F.3d 1248
NOTE: The following excerpt summarizes the Eleventh Circuit's approach to the issue of
monetary damages under the ADA in light of the Eleventh Amendment.
[Excerpt: Some footnotes and citations omitted.]
C. ADA Monetary Damages Claims
On appeal, Miller also argues that the
magistrate judge erred in granting summary
judgment for defendants on Miller's ADA
claims for monetary damages. As explained
above, the ADA applies to state prisons, and
Miller is entitled to prove his ADA claims
for injunctive relief against defendant
Warden Sikes in his official capacity.
Regarding Miller's ADA claims for
monetary damages, however, this case
presents the formidable legal question of
whether Congress constitutionally abrogated
the Eleventh Amendment in Title II of the
ADA....
Neither the Supreme Court nor this Court,
however, has yet addressed the precise issue
in this case: whether States can be sued for
monetary damages for violations of Title II
of the ADA, as applied in the prison context.
2. Eleventh-Amendment Analysis
As a general rule, the Eleventh Amendment
grants States immunity to suits brought by
private citizens in federal court. The
Supreme Court has recognized that
Congress can abrogate that sovereign
immunity where (1) Congress
"unequivocally expressed its intent to
abrogate" the States' sovereign immunity in
the statute at issue, and (2) "Congress acted
pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional
authority." Kimel v. Florida Bd of Regents,
528 US. 62, 73, 120 S. Ct. 631, 640, 145 L.
Ed. 2d 522 (2000). The ADA plainly states
that "[a] State shall not be immune under the
eleventh amendment to the Constitution of
the United States from an action in Federal
or State Court . . . for a violation of' the
ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12202. Accordingly, the
first requirement-a clear intention to
abrogate Eleventh-Amendment immunity-
is satisfied. See Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1985.
As to the second requirement, the ADA
invokes "the sweep of congressional
authority, including the power to enforce the
fourteenth amendment and to regulate
commerce. . . ." 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(b) (4).
However, the Supreme Court has clarified
that Congress may not abrogate the States'
Eleventh-Amendment immunity for
monetary-damages suits based on its Article
I commerce power. Garrett, 531 US. at
279
364, 121 S. Ct. at 962; Kimel, 528 U.S. at
79, 120 S. Ct. at 643. The paramount
question, then, is whether Congress's
intended abrogation of the States' Eleventh-
Amendment immunity in Title II of the ADA
was a valid exercise of its remedial powers
under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In determining whether Congress has acted
within the scope of its § 5 power to abrogate
States' sovereign immunity, the Supreme
Court applies the three-part "congruence and
proportionality" test first established in
Boerne. 521 US. at 520, 117 S. Ct. at 2164.
In applying the Boerne test, a court must:
(1) identify "with some precision the scope
of the constitutional right at issue," Board
of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 365,
121 S Ct. 955, 963, 148 L. Ed. 2d 866
(2001); (2) determine whether Congress
identified a history and pattern of
unconstitutional conduct by the States, and
(3) if so, analyze whether the statute is an
appropriate, congruent and proportional
response to that history and pattern of
unconstitutional treatment. Garrett, 531
U.S. at 374, 121 S. Ct. at 968; see Boerne,
521 US. at 520, 117 S. Ct. at 2164.
The Supreme Court in Lane concluded that
Title II of the ADA was enacted in response
to a history and pattern of constitutional
violations by the States, thereby satisfying
Boerne's step-two inquiry.
In the first step of the Boerne/Lane analysis,
we identify the scope of the constitutional
right at issue. Both Miller and the
defendants agree that the only right at issue
in this particular case is Miller's Eighth-
Amendment right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment.
The second step requires us to determine
whether Title II was enacted in response to a
history and pattern of constitutional
violations by the States. Although the
defendants argue there is insufficient
evidence of disability discrimination in
prisons, we conclude that this step-two
inquiry under Title II already has been
decided by the Supreme Court in Lane. As
previously discussed, in applying the second
step of the Boerne test, the Supreme Court
in Lane considered evidence of disability
discrimination in the administration of
public services and programs generally,
rather than focusing only on discrimination
in the context of access to the courts, and
concluded that Title 11 in its entirety satisfies
Boerne's step-two requirement that it be
enacted in response to a history and pattern
of States' constitutional violations. Id. at
1992. We are bound by that conclusion as
to step two.
We now proceed to the third and final step
of the Boerne/ Lane inquiry. This Court
must decide if Title II of the ADA, as
applied to claims rooted in the Eighth
Amendment, is an appropriate § 5 response
to the above-described history and pattern of
unconstitutional treatment. Lane, 124 S. Ct.
at 1992. Given Lane, we accepted at step
two that Title II was enacted in response to a
history and pattern of disability
discrimination in the administration of
public services and programs generally. To
give meaning to the Supreme Court's
context-by-context analytical approach,
however, we must consider, in step three,
the history of discrimination not generally
but specifically in the prison context, and the
scope of the Eighth-Amendment
constitutional right, and determine whether
the remedy afforded by Title II is congruent
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and proportional to its historical backdrop
and to the object of enforcing the Eighth-
Amendment right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment. Lane, 124 S C1. at
1993. To meet this congruence-and-
proportionality test, legislation must be
tailored to remedy or prevent the
demonstrated unconstitutional conduct.
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd v. College Say. Bank, 527 US.
627, 639, 119 S. Ct. 2199, 2207, 144 L. Ed.
2d 575 (1999).
We recognize that § 5 authorizes Congress
to deter Eighth-Amendment violations by
prohibiting "a somewhat broader swath of
conduct" than that prohibited by the Eighth
Amendment and by proscribing "facially
constitutional conduct[ ] in order to prevent
and deter unconstitutional conduct." Lane,
124 S. Ct. at 1985 (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted). Congress's remedial
and preventive measures, however, may not
go so far as to work a substantive change in
the governing Eighth-Amendment law.
Lane, 124 S. Ct. at 1986 (stating that
Congress's remedial and preventive
measures "may not work a 'substantive
change in the governing law"' (quoting
Boerne, 521 US. at 519, 117 S. Ct. at
2164)). In other words, § 5 does not place in
the hands of Congress a tool to rewrite the
Bill of Rights. Instead, when Congress
enacts § 5 prophylactic legislation, there
must be "proportionality or congruence
between the means adopted and the
legitimate end to be achieved." Boerne, 521
U.S. at 533, 117 S. Ct. at 2171.
. . . Even if a documented history of
disability discrimination specifically in the
prison context justifies application of some
congressional prophylactic legislation to
state prisons, what makes this case radically
different from Lane is the limited nature of
the constitutional right at issue and how
Title II, as applied to prisons, would
substantively and materially rewrite the
Eighth Amendment. In this case, we focus
on the limited nature of the Eighth-
Amendment right because in Lane, the
Supreme Court's conclusion that Title II's
remedy is congruent and proportional in the
access-to-courts context relied heavily upon
the nature of the constitutional right in issue
and the States' expansive due-process
obligation to provide individuals with access
to the courts. It was on that basis that the
Supreme Court concluded that the Title II-
imposed duty to accommodate is "perfectly
consistent with the well-established due
process principle that, within the limits of
practicability, a State must afford to all
individuals a meaningful opportunity to be
heard in its courts." Lane, 124 S. Ct. at
1994 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
This robust, positive due-process obligation
of the States to provide meaningful and
expansive court access is in stark contrast
with the States' Eighth-Amendment, negative
obligation to abstain from "cruel and
unusual punishment," a markedly narrow
restriction on prison administrative conduct.
In the prison context, the States historically
have wielded far-reaching discretion in their
treatment of inmates, confined only by the
limited Eighth-Amendment requirement that
such treatment not be "cruel and unusual
punishment." The Eighth Amendment has
no effect on most prison services, programs,
and activities, such as educational,
recreational, and job-training programs.
Rather, the Eighth Amendment is limited to
punishment, and "cruel and unusual"
punishment at that. In other words, the
Eighth Amendment imposes a narrow
restriction-"cruel and unusual"-on only a
limited sphere of prison administrative
conduct-"punishment." As explained
above, even as to that punishment sphere,
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negligence or gross negligence does not
satisfy the Eighth-Amendment standard.
Cottrell, 85 F.3d at 1490. Instead, a
prisoner alleging an Eighth-Amendment
violation confronts an exacting burden of
showing that the prison official wantonly
and willfully inflicted pain on the inmate.
Chandler, 2004 U.S. App. LEXIS 16246,
Slip Op. at 3368-69. The Eighth
Amendment regulates only a small slice of
prison administrative conduct.
Title II of the ADA, on the other hand,
purports to proscribe the exclusion of a
"qualified," disabled prisoner from
participation in any "services, programs, or
activities" of a public entity. Title II is not
tailored to provide prophylactic protection
of the Eighth-Amendment right; instead, it
applies to any service, program, or activity
provided by the prison, whether educational,
recreational, job-training, work in prison
industries, drug and alcohol counseling, or a
myriad of other prison services, programs,
and activities not affected by the Eighth
Amendment. Although we recognize
Congress's power to proscribe facially
constitutional conduct, Title II does not
merely proscribe a "somewhat broader
swath of conduct" than the Eighth
Amendment, but prohibits a different swath
of conduct that is far broader and even
totally unrelated to the Eighth Amendment in
many instances. In short, Title II prohibits
far more state conduct and in many more
areas of prison administration than
conceivably necessary to enforce the Eighth
Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual
punishment. Indeed, Title II addresses all
prison services, programs, and activities-
and goes well beyond the basic, humane
necessities guaranteed by the Eighth
Amendment-to disabled prisoners.
Accordingly, we conclude that Title I's
affirmative duty to accommodate qualified,
disabled prisoners is markedly different
than, and cannot be said to be "perfectly
consistent with," traditional protections
afforded by the Eighth Amendment. A
requirement of reasonable accommodations
for a qualified, disabled prisoner in the
prison's educational, recreational, and job-
training programs, for example, bears no
permissible prophylactic relationship to
deterring or remedying violations of
disabled prisoners' right to be free from
cruel and unusual punishment. Rather, Title
II of the ADA, as applied in the Eighth-
Amendment context to state prisons, fails to
meet the requirement of proportionality and
congruence.
. . . Simply put, to uphold Title II's
application to state prisons would allow
Congress to "rewrite" the Eighth-
Amendment law. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at
374, 121 S. Ct. at 968. Therefore, Title II of
the ADA, as applied in this prison case, does
not validly abrogate the States' sivereign
immunity and cannot be enforced against the
State of Georgia or the GDOC in a suit for
monetary damages.
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"Justices to Decide if Disabled Inmates
May Sue States for Damages"
New York Times
May 17, 2005
Linda Greenhouse
The Supreme Court agreed on Monday to
decide whether state prison inmates who
suffer discrimination on account of
disabilities could sue for damages under a
federal law, the Americans With Disabilities
Act.
The case, to be argued during the court's
next term, will be the latest chapter in the
court's long-running re-examination of the
constitutional balance between the federal
government and the states.
When Congress enacted the disabilities law
in 1990, it applied the law to the states and
included a statement of its intention to open
the states to lawsuits for damages. Under
the 11th Amendment, states enjoy immunity
from damage suits in federal court, unless
Congress explicitly states its intention to
abrogate the immunity and invokes a proper
constitutional basis for doing so.
Over the past 10 years, the Supreme Court
has constricted Congressional discretion in
this area.
The new case, United States v. Georgia, No.
04-1203, concerns Title II of the law, which
prohibits state and local governments from
discriminating on the basis of disability in
the provision of public services or programs.
The Supreme Court ruled in 1998 that
prisons fall within the definition of a public
program.
But that decision did not address the
constitutional issue that this case presents:
whether Congress had the authority to open
the states to damage suits by prisoners. The
United States Court of Appeals for the I Ith
Circuit said Congress did not, ruling in a
case brought by a Georgia prisoner who is a
paraplegic and uses a wheelchair.
The inmate, Tony Goodman, claimed that he
could not maneuver his wheelchair in his
small cell, to which he is confined for 23 to
24 hours a day.
As a result, Mr. Goodman argued in a
lawsuit that he filed on his own behalf, he is
deprived of access to a toilet and a shower,
as well as to his bed. The suit said guards
leave him sitting in his own waste rather
than assist him. He claimed in the suit that
the conditions violate the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment.
The federal government entered the case to
defend Mr. Goodman's right to bring the
lawsuit. Mr. Goodman, now represented by
a former solicitor general, Drew S. Days III,
of the law firm of Morrison & Foerster, also
filed his own appeal of the I Ith Circuit's
ruling, which the Supreme Court also
accepted in granting the government's
appeal.
In issuing its opinion last September, the
appeals court did not explain its reasoning,
relying instead on its decision in a separate
prisoner case that it had issued several days
earlier. In that case, Miller v. King, the
appeals court explained why it viewed the
issue as not governed by a recent Supreme
Court ruling that found Congress had
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properly opened the states to lawsuits under
Title II for depriving people with disabilities
of access to courtrooms.
In drawing a distinction between that case
and the prison case, the 11th Circuit said the
Eighth Amendment did not provide an
adequate basis for Congress to breach the
states' immunity. The "robust, positive due-
process obligation of the states to provide
meaningful and expansive court access is in
stark contrast with the states' Eighth
Amendment, negative obligation to abstain
from 'cruel and unusual punishment,"' the
appeals court said.
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"Recent Petition From the SG"
SCOTUS Blog
March 16, 2005
Kevin Russell
On March 9, the Solicitor General filed a
petition for certiorari in United States v.
Georgia, No. 04-1203, a potential follow up
case to Last Term's Tennessee v. Lane. The
petition seeks review of the Eleventh
Circuit's determination that Congress lacked
the constitutional authority to abrogate
States' sovereign immunity to prisoner
lawsuits claiming violations of Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).
Given that there is now a 2-1 split on that
question, and the fact that the United States
is seeking review, it seems likely that the
Court will grant the petition for next Term.
Title II of the ADA prohibits disability
discrimination in the "services, programs or
activities of a public entity," which the
Court held in Pennsylvania Dep 't of
Corrections v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206 (1998),
encompasses disability discrimination in
prisons. However, the Court held open
whether, so construed, Title 11 was a
constitutional exercise of Congress'
authority to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment.
That question arose in this case when
Georgia moved to dismiss Title II claims
brought by Tony Goodman, a Georgia
inmate confined to a wheelchair due to
spinal injuries. Goodman alleges that
because of his disability, he is kept in the
maximum security wing of the prison and
left in his 12-by-3-foot cell for 23-24 hours a
day. And because the cell is not wheelchair
accessible, he cannot turn his chair around in
his cell and cannot access the toilet without
assistance, which is frequently denied.
Goodman also alleges that because of
accessibility problems, he has been denied
access to religious services and the prison
law library, as well as other prison
programs.
The State asserted that regardless of whether
or not the prison was in compliance with the
ADA, Goodman could not sue the State
because Congress lacked the constitutional
authority to abrogate the State's sovereign
immunity to private suits under Title II.
Because the Supreme Court has held that
Congress may only abrogate a State's
sovereign immunity pursuant to a valid
exercise of its authority to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment, the question
became whether Title II is valid Fourteenth
Amendment legislation-one of the
questions left open in Yeskey.
In answering that question, the Eleventh
Circuit and other courts have looked to two
prior Supreme Court cases that considered
whether Congress constitutionally abrogated
sovereign immunity under the ADA. In
University of Alabama v. Garrett, a five-
member majority of the Court held that Title
I of the ADA-which applies to
employment-was not valid Fourteenth
Amendment legislation. The Court noted
that Title I prohibits far more conduct than
would be held unconstitutional under the
rational basis test applied to disability
discrimination under the Equal Protection
Clause. And the Court found that there was
no history of pervasive State violations of
the constitutional rights of disabled
employees that would justify broad
prophylactic legislation.
285
On the other hand, when faced with an
actual challenge to Title II itself, the Court
held in Tennessee v. Lane that Title 11 is
valid Fourteenth Amendment legislation, at
least as applied to require accessibility in
judicial services. Plaintiffs in Lane sued the
state over the inaccessibility of county
courthouses to people in wheelchairs. The
State argued that the reasoning of Garrett
applied equally to Title II, but a majority of
the Court (the dissenters from Garrett plus
Justice O'Connor), held otherwise. The
Court held that there was ample evidence
that people with disabilities were frequently
subject to unconstitutional and otherwise
unequal treatment in the administration of
public services, justifying prophylactic
legislation addressing government programs
(even if there was no such history
supporting prophylactic legislation relating
to government employment).
Although the Court's history discussion in
Lane surveyed Title II in all its applications,
the Court ultimately pulled back and decided
the case on narrower grounds, holding that
Title II was valid prophylactic legislation as
applied to access to judicial services.
Among other things, the Court noted that in
this context, Title II often enforces
constitutional rights that are subject to
heightened scrutiny, such as the rights of
criminal defendants to attend their own
trials.
Many have criticized Lane and Garrett as
inconsistent with one another. The fact that
only Justice O'Connor was in the majority
of both Garrett and Lane has created
substantial uncertainty whether Lane's
emphasis on the pervasive history of
disability discrimination in public service
will be sufficient to sustain Title II even in
contexts where "fundamental rights" are not
implicated.
That question is presently being hashed out
in the lower courts as they attempt to apply
Lane's "as applied" analysis to other
contexts. Perhaps not surprisingly (given
the number of prisoner lawsuits generally),
the first post-Lane cases to percolate to the
courts of appeals have been prison cases.
(Other cases working their way through the
courts concern Title II's application to
education, institutionalization and
licensing).
Three Circuits have now addressed the
question in the prison context, two holding
the ADA abrogation unconstitutional and
one holding it valid. The Eleventh Circuit's
decision in Georgia was joined yesterday by
the Third Circuit's decision in Cochran v.
Pinchak. On the other side of the split, the
Ninth Circuit in Phiffer v. Columbia River
Corr. Inst., confronted the issue on a remand
from the Supreme Court for reconsideration
after Lane. The Ninth Circuit declined,
however, to revisit prior circuit precedent
that had held that Title II is valid Fourteenth
Amendment legislation in all its
applications.
The opinions in these three cases have made
clear that there is some substantial
disagreement and confusion about how to
employ Lane's "as applied" analysis in other
areas. In the prison context, Title 11
implicates a number of constitutional rights,
including the Equal Protection Clause,
Eighth Amendment, Due Process Clause,
First Amendment right to Free Exercise of
Religion, etc. In its briefs, the United States
has been arguing that courts of appeals must
determine the validity of Title II as applied
to prisons generally, taking into account all
of the constitutional rights involved.
However, in both Goodman and Cochran,
the courts refused to consider whether Title
II validly enforced rights not directly at
issue in the case before it. Thus, the
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Eleventh Circuit only considered Title II's
relationship to the Eighth Amendment,
while the Third Circuit only considered Title
II's enforcement of the Equal Protection
Clause. The Ninth Circuit, on the other
hand, inexplicably refused to engage in any
"as-applied" analysis at all.
In his Georgia petition, the SG points to this
confusion over the "as applied" analysis as a
reason for the Court to grant certiorari
sooner rather than later, since the methods
employed in these early prison cases will
inevitably be applied in subsequent cases in
other contexts as well.
If the Court agrees, it will have three
petitions to choose from. In addition to the
Government's petition in Georgia, Goodman
himself is seeking cert., No. 04-1236,
represented by former Solicitor General
Drew Days and Prof. Sam Bagenstos, one of
the attorneys from Lane. The State of
Oregon also filed a petition in Phiffer, No.
04-947. The Court is likely to consider all
three petitions simultaneously, after the
responses are filed in each case in late
March and early April.
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"Disabled People Can Sue States
Over Access, High Court Rules"
Los Angeles Times
May 18, 2004
David G. Savage
The Supreme Court on Monday narrowly
held that states were subject to the
provisions of the Americans With
Disabilities Act, ruling that they could be
sued for excluding disabled people from
courthouses or voting booths or denying
them crucial public services.
The 5-4 decision-which rejected a claim of
states' rights-turned on the Constitution's
demand that states not deny people "the
equal protection of the laws." It came on the
50th anniversary of the court's decision in
Brown vs. Board of Education, which used
the same constitutional provision to overturn
state-sanctioned racial segregation.
The five justices in the majority said
Monday that a state's "pattern of unequal
treatment" of people with disabilities, like a
state's discrimination against blacks,
violated the Constitution. Victims of such
discrimination may sue the state, the court
said.
The four dissenting justices said states have
a "sovereign immunity" that shields them
from such claims.
The decision arose from a rural Tennessee
courthouse that had no ramps or elevators to
its second-floor hearing rooms, and the high
court's ruling will put new pressure on
public officials to provide full access to
disabled individuals. This could mean
providing sign-language interpreters for
those who are deaf or making sure that
disabled people can travel freely on public
buses and trains.
The practical effect of the decision in
California and other states is not clear.
Since the 1970s, federal law has required
public buildings to accommodate those with
disabilities. Schools, colleges, libraries and
courthouses have installed ramps and
elevators. But in some areas, particularly in
rural communities, older buildings have not
been renovated.
"Today's decision is a huge win at a critical
time for millions of Americans with
disabilities," said Ira Burnim, legal director
at the Bazelon Center for Mental Health
Law in Washington. It "narrowly rejected a
radical reinterpretation of states' rights that
would have robbed millions of a vital means
of protecting their civil rights."
Jennifer Mathis, an attorney with the same
disability rights group, said: "Accessibility
means many things. It is not just about
getting in the front door."
However, for George Lane, the issue was
getting in the front door.
In 1996, he was summoned to appear at the
Polk County, Tenn., courthouse on a
misdemeanor driving charge resulting from
an accident that put him in a wheelchair.
When he arrived at the courthouse, he
learned the hearing was on the second floor.
To get to the hearing, he had to crawl up two
flights of stairs. When he was called back
for a second appearance, he refused and was
arrested for failing to appear. He then sued
Tennessee under the Americans With
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Disabilities Act, contending that the state
had failed to make "reasonable
modifications" to 25 county courthouses to
aid people in wheelchairs. He was joined by
Beverly Jones, a disabled court reporter,
who said she had missed out on assignments
because she could not get to some
courtrooms.
Their case became a test of whether the
disabilities act could be enforced against the
states.
When President George H.W. Bush signed
the act into law in 1990, it was hailed as a
landmark in providing full equality for
people with disabilities. It prohibited
employers, school, colleges and public
agencies from discriminating against people
with severe physical or mental impairments,
and it required them to take reasonable steps
to accommodate the disabled.
But in recent years, there had been doubts
about whether this federal mandate could be
enforced.
In a series of 5-4 rulings, the high court's
conservative majority said states had a
"sovereign immunity" shielding them from
certain federal laws, including the
disabilities act.
Three years ago, for example, the court
ruled that disabled state employees could not
sue their agencies for discrimination under
the act if they were fired or demoted because
of their impairments.
The states could "quite hardheadedly-and
hardheartedly-hold to job qualification
requirements that do not make allowance for
the disabled," Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist wrote in the case, involving a
nurse at an Alabama state hospital who was
demoted after treatment for breast cancer.
Relying on that precedent, Tennessee's
lawyers argued that the states also should be
shielded from the part of the law that
required them to open their buildings and
services to disabled individuals. A high
court ruling in Tennessee's favor would have
all but voided the act's application to state
agencies.
But Bush administration lawyers joined
Lane's side in arguing that the mandate to
open facilities to disabled people could be
upheld as a civil-rights enforcement measure
under the 14th Amendment. That post-Civil
War measure says Congress may "enforce,
by appropriate legislation," basic civil rights
against violations by the states.
That argument prevailed in Tennessee vs.
Lane, thanks to a crucial shift by Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor. She abandoned her
conservative colleagues who support states'
rights and voted with the court's liberal bloc
to uphold the disability rights claims
whenever "fundamental rights" are at stake.
Justice John Paul Stevens, speaking for the
court, said Congress had enacted the law
"against a backdrop of pervasive unequal
treatment" against the disabled, "including
systematic deprivation of fundamental
rights." But he stopped short of saying
states can be sued in all circumstances-
including, for example, by disabled
prisoners.
Instead, he said, the law stands whenever a
"fundamental right" such as voting or access
to the courts is at issue.
Justices David H. Souter, Ruth Bader
Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer joined with
Stevens and O'Connor.
The four dissenters, led by Rehnquist, said
they would have voided the entire law.
289
Constitutional rights for the disabled are
"quite limited," Rehnquist said. The
Constitution "permits a state to classify on
the basis of disability so long as it has a
rational basis for doing so," he said,
including a desire to save money.
Rehnquist was joined by Justices Clarence
Thomas, Antonin Scalia and Anthony M.
Kennedy.
Despite the narrowness of the ruling,
disability-rights advocates were relieved.
"Today's decision is a welcome reversal of
the Rehnquist court's onslaught on disability
rights, but this fight is not over," said
Andrew J. Imparato, president of the
American Assn. of People With Disabilities.
"Four justices still do not understand the
connection between Brown vs. Board of
Education, the Constitution's protection of
individual rights and the right to be present
at your own trial if you use a wheelchair."
Lane's lawsuit against Tennessee has been
on hold since 1998, and his lawyer, William
J. Brown, said Monday that Lane was eager
to pursue his claim.
"He went through two humiliating and
painful experiences. We are grateful that the
court has sent a clear signal that the states
can no longer hide behind their claims of
immunity," Brown said. "This is an
important and dramatic statement, and it's
appropriate it comes on the day we celebrate
the anniversary of Brown vs. Board of
Education."
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"Attorney Hopes High Court Will Clarify Intent
Regarding Title II Lawsuits"
Disability Compliance Bulletin
June 9, 2005
Was the U.S. Supreme Court's expansion of
the right to sue states under Title II of ADA
in Tennessee v. Lane, 28 NDLR 65 (U.S.
2004), an aberration or the start of a shift in
disability law?
The answer could come as early as the High
Court's next session, according to attorney
Seth Galanter of Morrison & Foerster in
Washington D.C.
Galanter is one of the team of lawyers
preparing to convince the Justices that state
prisoners with disabilities have the same
fundamental right to sue states as disabled
citizens seeking access to court services, the
driving issue in Lane.
The case on which Galanter is working, in
collaboration with former U.S. Solicitor
General Drew S. Days III and others is
United States v. Georgia, petition for cert.
granted (U.S. 05/16/05) (No. 04-1203). The
lawsuit is on appeal from the 11th U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals.
"I very much think that this is an appropriate
case to test the scope of Congress's authority
to enforce the ADA, and the Bill of Rights
as a whole," said Galanter. "The facts of
this case really convey the types of
discrimination that Congress was trying to
target when it passed the ADA 15 years
ago."
In Lane, the High Court ruled that Title II of
the ADA, as applied specifically to cases
implicating the fundamental right of access
to the courts, is a valid exercise of
Congress's enforcement powers under the
14th Amendment. In this case the 11th
Circuit held that Title II does not abrogate
state sovereign immunity for suits by state
prisoners alleging discriminations in state-
operated prisons.
Inmate Tony Goodman claims that because
the Georgia State Prison in Reidsville, Ga.,
is not equipped for people in wheelchairs, he
has been denied access to basic state
services at the facility for more than seven
years.
"We contend the situation was unlawful and
the violations of Title 1I are ongoing,"
Galanter said. "Goodman continues to be
denied access to the kinds of services other,
nondisabled prisoners receive, and in fact he
still spends many nights sleeping in his
.wheelchair because he cannot transfer in and
out of it without assistance which is not
forthcoming."
Galanter said his firm took on the case
because it believed a fundamental right was
in jeopardy and because after several years
of litigation, no sign of redress for Goodman
was in sight.
"Our basic question for the Justices is this:
Did you really mean to carve out an
exception for Title II lawsuits related to
court access and leave virtually all other
government services immune to litigation
for money damages?" Galanter said.
"If so, please explain the rationale, because
we're already seeing a split develop among
the Circuits in how to interpret Lane," he
added.
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Galanter said the changes Goodman's suit
seeks to prison policies, procedures and
practices are "simple things that aren't going
to cost a lot of money, but are necessary for
him to receive even the minimal level of
treatment all prisoners are entitled to."
He said he expects several advocacy groups
for the disabled to file amicus curiae briefs
with the High Court by the June 30 deadline
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"Disabled Inmate Jail First of Its Kind"
Associated Press
April 17, 2005
LEXINGTON, Okla.-Construction is
expected to begin within the next few weeks
on a $5 million, 262-bed facility for disabled
inmates on the grounds of the Joseph Harp
Correctional Institution in Lexington.
Officials with the Oklahoma Department of
Corrections say the long wait for the facility
will be worth it, if they can manage to find
the money to staff it.
Charlie Groves, DOC project manager, said
the decision to build the unit was reached
after the state commissioned a study that
showed a critical need for a facility for
elderly inmates and prisoners with severe
physical limitations.
"Our cells aren't made for the physically
handicapped," Groves said. "The original
concept with this facility was to make it into
a medical facility but the direction was
changed over the years."
The male-only facility will join the other 40
buildings on the medium security institution
property.
Though the unit will feature American
Disabilities Act accommodations such as
wider door frames and ramps, Groves said it
will be "just like any other holding facility"
and have an outside area for exercise, a
dining hall and prison beds.
"These people aren't going to be bedridden
or terminally ill," Groves said.
Joseph Harp warden Mike Addison said the
facility will save the state money by
concentrating physically disabled inmates.
Additionally, 12 able-bodied inmates will be
housed at the new facility to assist the
disabled in getting from rooms to dining
halls and common areas, Groves said.
"We are really looking forward to it. Of
course, it's new so we'll learn as we go
along, but there are a lot of people who are
needing this and a lot that are currently
farmed out to other facilities that won't have
to be now," Addison said.
The flip side, Addison said, is that while the
state is funding the construction of the
facility, that doesn't mean they will provide
the funding to staff it.
"It's an extra 262 inmates, and that will put
the population around 1,400," Addison said.
"And right now it's looking like our
(current) staff will be the ones in charge of
it. We are carrying a 21 percent vacancy
rate. We're down 60-plus staff members
where we normally would be already."
293
Status Report on Federalism
"The Court's Faux Federalism: A Year at the Supreme Court (2004)"
Ramesh Ponnuru
Speaking soon after the end of the 2002
Supreme Court term, Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg said, "Federalism this term was
the dog that did not bark." The expression
traces back to the Sherlock Holmes story
"The Adventure of Silver Blaze," where the
dog's silence provides evidence about a
theft. Have the justices carted off the
Rehnquist Court's federalism revolution
while we weren't looking? The states did
not fare well in the Court's last term. The
case most widely taken as a defeat was
Nevada Department of Human Resources v.
Hibbs, in which a six-justice majority led by
Chief Justice William Rehnquist ruled that
Congress had the power to subject state
governments to lawsuits under the Family
and Medical Leave Act. The states might
have thought this would be an easy win,
based on previous Court rulings restricting
the ability of Congress to authorize lawsuits
against state governments. The majority
found, however, that the Family and
Medical Leave Act was meant to combat an
"invalid gender stereotype" (specifically, the
view that mothers are more likely than
fathers to stay home to take care of their
children, which we all know is a ludicrous
folk belief based on no underlying reality).
As such, the act fell within the scope of
Congress's power, under section five of the
Fourteenth Amendment, to enforce the
egalitarian requirements of that amendment
on the states. This reasoning would
doubtless have come as a surprise to most of
the congressmen and senators who voted for
the act, who thought they were merely
mandating a popular benefit rather than
striking a blow for feminism.
Franchise Tax Board of California v. Hyatt
was the next most prominent federalism case
that went badly for the states. Hyatt had left
California for the friendlier tax climate of
Nevada. The California tax authorities
pursued him there, allegedly committing
torts against Hyatt in both states. Hyatt sued,
and the Nevada Supreme Court found that
the suit should proceed under Nevada law.
California, backed by most state attorneys
general, protested that Nevada's courts had
to give weight to California law. The U.S.
Supreme Court turned back the AGs,
affirming the Nevada court's decision.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co. v. Campbell was another nationalist
win: The Supreme Court restricted state
courts' ability to impose punitive damages.
Hillside Dairy v. Lyons reaffirmed the
"dormant commerce clause": State
governments may be barred from interfering
with interstate commerce even when
Congress has not explicitly acted to bar
them. In Pierce County v. Guillen,
Congress was allowed to order state courts
(as well as federal courts) not to accept
certain kinds of evidence. This order was
designed to restrain litigation that would
adversely affect interstate commerce, and
was thus held to be a legitimate exercise of
Congress's commerce-clause powers. In
American Insurance Association v.
Garamendi, the Court said that a
presidential agreement with a foreign
country could pre-empt state law-even if
the agreement itself does not say that it pre-
empts state law, and even if there is no
formal agreement at all.
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There were a few cases on the other side of
the ledger. The Court's decisions regarding
affirmative action granted states some
autonomy in setting the admissions policies
at state universities: The Court neither
required nor prohibited preferential
affirmative action. In Pharmaceutical
Research and Manufacturers of America v.
Maine, the Court upheld a Maine program
that pressured drugmakers to hold prices
down. Kentucky Association of Health Plans
v. Miller read federal law to allow states
more freedom to regulate health insurance.
In Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, the Court
rejected a claim that federal regulation pre-
empted state lawsuits. As barks go, these
were rather quiet.
It would go too far to say that the 2002 term
means that the federalist revolution is over.
The near-landmark decisions associated with
that revolution have neither been overruled
nor rendered dead letters; the Court has left
itself the freedom to invalidate future
congressional acts for trampling on the
states. The Court has not retreated entirely
from the "clear statement" rule announced a
decade ago: To pre-empt state law,
Congress has to say that's what it's doing. It
could even be argued that the 2002 term
represented a continuation, or rather a
consolidation, of the federalist revolution:
By signaling that this revolution would not
go too far, the swing justices were trying to
get the nationalist judges to make their
peace with it.
But perhaps the federalist revolution is
neither ending nor being consolidated.
There is a third alternative: There never was
a federalist revolution-or, at least, the
revolution was never what it was cracked up
to be.
* * *
III. HITTING A WALL
For all the fears the Court's federalist turn
inspired, there was a natural limit to how far
it could go. Three constraints were bound to
affect the Court eventually. In 2002-2003,
the Court ran into all three of them.
The first constraint is a straightforward
political one: The Court cannot implement a
federalism agenda that is seen as rolling
back either the New Deal or civil rights in
any serious way. Moreover, the Court has
no interest in doing so-perhaps in part
because key justices do not want their
federalist turn to be interpreted as an attack
on the New Deal or civil rights. Obviously,
however, this limit means that a vast range
of federal action will be untouched by the
Court's federalism.
The Court is not going to get back into the
business of distinguishing between intrastate
and interstate commerce, and invalidating
congressional regulation of the former; it left
that field for good in the 1930s. It is not
going to distinguish "commerce among the
states" from manufacture. Most federal
economic regulation will be upheld.
This reluctance to go too far politically may
explain why the Court did what it did in
Hibbs. Morrison implicated civil rights at
least as much as Hibbs did, of course, but
only in a symbolic way. Hibbs involved an
intersection of an alleged civil-rights
concern and a federally-mandated economic
benefit. That may have been too much for
the Court to threaten. If the distinction
between Hibbs and Morrison is hard to
ascertain, however, it is less difficult to see
what separates it from the other sovereign
immunity cases. The Court is willing to
protect states from lawsuits in federal
court-unless those lawsuits allege
particular kinds of state discrimination.
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Specifically, lawsuits are allowed to combat
discrimination against groups that the Court
itself has identified as "suspect classes":
women, racial minorities, and (weirdly
enough) railroads. When states enact laws
that discriminate against these classes, the
Court subjects those laws to "strict scrutiny"
and will generally invalidate them.
Evidently, the Court will also subject
lawsuits concerning state discrimination
against other classes-e.g., the old and the
disabled-to what might be called a kind of
strict scrutiny. In Kimel v. Florida Board of
Regents (2000), states were held to be
immune from lawsuits under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act even
when Congress was found to have sought to
abrogate their immunity. In Board of
Trustees of the University of Alabama v.
Garrett (2001), states received immunity
from Americans with Disabilities Act
lawsuits, too. The rule that women and
racial minorities can sue and other groups
can't is, in my view, the most plausible
reading of Hibbs.
The second constraint is the Court's own
confusion about what federalism is. The
Court's federalism cases are replete with
references to the "dignity," "status," and
"interests" of states. The states are, in this
view, an interest group with a special claim
on kind treatment from the federal
government. But this is not the only way to
conceive of federalism. Federalism could be
about dividing governmental responsibilities
and ensuring political accountability, and
there is much in the writing of the Founders
to indicate that these imperatives were on
their minds. Insisting on a federalism of this
sort could-would-place limits on state
governments and lead to results they would
find most undignified. You could call it a
federalism for citizens rather than states.
Or, perhaps, a libertarian federalism.
Finally, the federalist turn faces a third
powerful constraint: The Court's
unwillingness to police the boundaries of
federalism against itself. We forget,
sometimes, when we speak of the Supreme
Court's restricting or expanding what
government can do, that the Court is itself
part of the federal government. For the
Supreme Court to protect the states from the
federal government, it must not only restrain
Congress (and the president). It must
restrain itself. It must reduce its own power.
This it has shown no interest in doing.
As has often been noted, none of the
landmark Warren and Burger Court
individual rights cases, most of which
undermined state autonomy, have been
overturned. What may be more important is
the reason for the Court's reluctance to
revisit these issues. There is some evidence
that the Court's is motivated by a concern
for its own institutional authority as much as
for legal stability. The Court has said as
much in one high-profile case, Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, the 1992 case re-
affirming the "central holding" of Roe v.
Wade (1973).
The Casey Court begins by noting the
scandal of disagreement:
Liberty finds no refuge in a
jurisprudence of doubt. Yet 19 years
after our holding that the
Constitution protects a woman's
right to terminate her pregnancy in
its early stages, Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973), that definition of
liberty is still questioned. Joining the
respondents as amicus curiae, the
United States, as it has done in five
other cases in the last decade, again
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asks us to overrule Roe.
An intolerance for national division, for
conflict, is not the most promising of
mindsets for the agents of a federalist
revolution to have. Nor is the sense that our
national identity is as fragile as the Casey
plurality believes it to be. To the extent that
Roe itself generated fierce political conflict,
the Court has started an "implosive cycle":
The Court's centralizing moves produce
conflict, which then justify further assertions
of the Court's national authority.
The great federalist case of the 2002 term
was thus not Hibbs but Lawrence v. Texas.
State laws against sodomy were dying off,
as they should have been. But the Court was
not willing to wait. Instead, it issued an
expansive ruling about liberty "in its spatial
and more transcendent dimensions."
Nobody was sure what to make of that
phrase, or agree on the implications of the
ruling for other policy issues. But it is clear
that the decision was not good news for
social conservatives, even those who held no
brief for sodomy laws themselves. Once
again, the Court has taken sides in the
culture wars-and taken the same side.
* * *
The Supreme Court may very well impose
more marginal restrictions on congressional
power against the states in the 2003 term
and in terms to come. (It will always be
possible to distinguish away Hibbs when the
Court has the inclination to do so. The
Court can just manipulate the level of
deference to Congress to reach the desired
result.) The sovereign-immunity doctrine
may expand. But after two decades, we
have an answer to one question. Is the
Supreme Court likely to lead a revival of the
federalism contemplated by the Founders?
The answer is no. That dog will not bark
again.
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"A Deeply Rooted Revolution"
Legal Times
July 8, 2005
Herman Schwartz
From their earliest days on the Supreme
Court, Chief Justice William Rehnquist and
retiring Justice Sandra Day O'Connor have
worked to restrict the federal government's
authority to manage the national economy
and to strengthen individual rights. With the
aid of Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony
Kennedy, and Clarence Thomas, they have
enjoyed remarkable success. Scholars
concurred that a federalism "revolution" had
rewritten constitutional law.
But in three recent decisions-Nevada v.
Hibbs (2003), Tennessee v. Lane (2004), and
Gonzales v. Raich (2005}-the states' rights
argument lost and federal statutes were
upheld. Suddenly, some observers
concluded that what seemed to be a
revolution was only a "boomlet [that] has
fizzled," as Michael Greve of the
conservative American Enterprise Institute
put it. The Raich case in particular was
called a "disaster" by the Cato Institute's
Roger Pilon, another outspoken assailant of
federal power. All this led the New York
Times' respected Supreme Court reporter,
Linda Greenhouse, to speculate that "What
had seemed until very recently to be a
legacy in the making, now appears
evanescent, perhaps even illusory."
Hardly. With youthful replacements for
O'Connor and Rehnquist, who will possibly
retire soon (and possibly even more high
court appointments for President George W.
Bush), the federalism revolution is probably
as safe today as it ever was-and probably
safer. A few split decisions can hardly
reverse 15 years of rulings,
Usually in the majority since the 1990s,
Rehnquist and O'Connor steadily trained
their sights on the social welfare and civil
rights lawmaking that began with the New
Deal and continued into the 1970s and even
the 1980s. (Only in the area of women's
rights did O'Connor consistently defect.)
Their broad and deep federalism legacy
produced key changes in how we understand
the I Ith Amendment, Section 5 of the 14th
Amendment, the 10th Amendment, and the
commerce clause.
Shielding the States
The earliest federalism victory for Rehnquist
came in an 1 Ith Amendment case more than
three decades ago.
The 11th Amendment provides in its
entirety: "The Judicial power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or
prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens
or Subjects of any Foreign State." For
years, there had been little litigation
involving the amendment.
Then in Edelman v. Jordan (1974), the
newly appointed Justice Rehnquist put
together a 5-4 majority to hold that states'
immunity from suits in federal courts barred
aged, blind, and disabled Social Security
recipients from suing individual state
officials for past benefits wrongly withheld
by the state. In response to the late Justice
Thurgood Marshall's contention that the
states had impliedly waived their immunity
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by participating in the federal Social
Security program, Rehnquist declared that
such a waiver could be based only on the
"most express language . . . or
overwhelming implications from the text" of
the statute. This was followed by another 5-
4 decision in which Rehnquist joined,
Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon
(1985), reaffirming the "clear statement"
doctrine.
Today, both the prohibition on damages
suits for past wrongs and the clear-statement
doctrine are established 11th Amendment
law and in no jeopardy.
Twenty-two years after Edelman, in
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida(1996),
now Chief Justice Rehnquist achieved one
of his most significant 11th Amendment
triumphs: the establishment of a sweeping
state immunity from virtually all private
suits to which the states had not consented.
Ranging far beyond the text of the
amendment, Rehnquist wrote that state
sovereign immunity barred all attempts by
Congress to allow suits against a state-
except to enforce Section 5 of the 14th
Amendment or unless the state waived its
immunity.
Subsequent decisions have abandoned any
link to the constitutional text, ultimately
barring federally authorized suits-even in
state courts-in Alden v. Maine (1999). In
all of these, O'Connor was part of the
narrow 5-4 majority.
Undue Process
The newly appointed Justice Rehnquist also
struck quickly at Section 5 of the 14th
Amendment, although his first effort failed.
Section 5 states: "The Congress shall have
power to enforce, by appropriate legislation,
the provisions of this article." It had been
read as a broad grant of congressional power
to enforce Section 1 provisions of the 14th
Amendment stating: "[N]or shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws."
In Hutto v. Finney (1978), Rehnquist wrote
to urge that Section 5 be limited to equal
protection cases and not apply to all rights
"incorporated" in the 14th Amendment
through the due process clause. Back then,
he was in dissent.
It took almost 20 years, but the assault on
Section 5 ultimately succeeded. The change
began with City of Boerne v. Flores (1997),
a case in which the Court, speaking through
Kennedy, ruled that Congress' Section 5
power was limited to creating remedies that
are "congruent" and "proportionate" to the
"remedial or preventive object."
What that meant soon became clear. In a
rapid-fire series of 5-4 decisions over the
next few years, the Court struck down
private suits against state agencies provided
for under the Patent Remedy Act (1999), the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(2000), the Violence Against Women Act
(2000), and Title I of the Americans with
Disabilities Act (2001). In three opinions
written by Rehnquist and one by O'Connor,
the Court read Section 5 as an increasingly
limited exception to the 11th Amendment
restriction on Congress' power to authorize
suits. In the Violence Against Women Act
case, the chief justice even held that the
Section 5 exception does not apply in
situations where a state wrongfully failed to
act-although nothing in Section 5 draws a
distinction between acts and failures to act.
No one should expect that the Court, having
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gone that far on Section 5, will change its
mind easily.
They See 'Policies'
The Court once described the 10th
Amendment as simply a "truism." It states:
"The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by
it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people." But
Rehnquist and O'Connor found real limits
reflected in that language.
The first victory came in 1976, in National
League of Cities v. Usery. In a 5-4 decision,
Rehnquist wrote that while the amendment
had no substantive content, it set forth a
general constitutional "policy," which in this
case barred the federal government from
requiring states to observe the minimum-
wage and maximum-hour requirements of
the Fair Labor Standards Act.
The victory seemed short-lived. Joining the
Court in 1981, O'Connor quickly found
herself allied with Rehnquist on this issue on
the losing side of two cases; she wrote for
the dissent in Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission v. Mississippi (1982) and joined
the dissent in Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission v. Wyoming
(1983). A few years later, the Court finally
overruled National League of Cities as
"unworkable" in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority (1985).
But the ghost of National League of Cities
continued to hover over the justices' work.
In New York v. United States (1992),
O'Connor wrote to prevent the federal
government from "commandeering" state
and local officials to enforce a federal
statute on nuclear waste. Though she did
not rely directly on National League of
Cities or on the text of the 10th Amendment,
which she conceded to be "essentially a
tautology," O'Connor's reasoning paralleled
that of the 1976 decision: She discovered an
amorphous nontextual "policy" that was
"confirmed" in the 10th Amendment-
namely, the "federal structure" of the
Constitution.
Five years later, Scalia followed with an
even broader decision in Printz v, United
States(1997), striking down an obligation
imposed by the federal Brady law requiring
local law enforcement officials to assist in
preventing illegal gun sales as
unconstitutional "commandeering."
Shrinking Commerce
The 10th, 11th, and 14th amendments are all
key to the federalism revolution, but the
battle that has probably received the most
attention has been fought over the commerce
clause. The first strike against Congress'
power "to regulate Commerce"-a very
difficult target given the history of the last
century-was made in Lopez v. United
States (1995). An opinion by Rehnquist
nullified a federal law restricting the
possession of guns near schools on the
grounds that it had no substantial nexus with
interstate commerce.
The heavier blow, however, came in another
Rehnquist opinion, United States v.
Morrison (2000), which blocked Congress
from using the commerce clause to reach
noneconomic transactions regardless of their
impact on interstate commerce. A year
later, he wrote again for the Court in Solid
Waste Agency of Northern Cork County v.
US. Army Corps of Engineers (2001), to
come to a restrictive interpretation of the
Clean Water Act that was required to "avoid
significant constitutional [i.e., commerce
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clause] questions."
Once, a broad commerce clause easily
undergirded much of Congress' work.
Today, that work is threatened by a line of
precedent firmly establishing a narrower
reading.
The Legacy Is Safe
Indeed, few of the rulings that make up the
federalism revolution are likely to fall
anytime soon. And the three more-recent
decisions upholding federal power don't
undercut that. All three cases were
relatively simple to decide and did not
deviate much from the doctrines developed
in the earlier cases.
Both Nevada v. Hibbs and Tennessee v.
Lane involved interests to which the Court
has given special protection. Hibbs, which
upheld the Family and Medical Leave Act
under Congress' Section 5 power, was a
gender case. Both Rehnquist and O'Connor
had indicated earlier that race and gender
discrimination fell safely within Section 5's
coverage, and the chief justice had shown
himself to be sympathetic on gender
discrimination in the Virginia Military
Institute case, United States v. Virginia
(1996). Rehnquist himself wrote for the
majority in Hibbs, joined by O'Connor.
Lane, also a Section 5 case, was brought
under Title II of the ADA to ensure that the
disabled had access to courthouses, which
the Court described as a "basic right"
warranting scrutiny at least as rigorous as
gender discrimination. It is not clear how
much further Kennedy, who joined the four
liberals, will go in enforcing the ADA
against state authorities in other contexts.
And despite the states' rights argument, few
observers had seriously expected the
government to lose Gonzales v. Raich,
which involved federal drug law
enforcement. Both Kennedy and Scalia
joined the majority.
In other words, the federalism revolution is
very much alive. The Court's current
federalism doctrines will likely be extended
and expanded in the coming years with or
without Rehnquist. Judging by Bush's own
views and those of his appellate court
nominees, O'Connor's successor will
probably be an even more consistently right-
wing vote than she has been. We may soon
be witnessing a truly radical constitutional
revolution, and not just in federalism.
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The Rehnquist Court and Its Imperiled States' Rights Legacy
New York Times
June 12, 2005
Linda Greenhouse
Will the Rehnquist Court's federalism
revolution outlast the Rehnquist Court?
If Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist retires
this summer, as appears likely, the court's
ruling last week that federal drug law trumps
states on the use of medical marijuana will
be its last word on federal-state relations
during his tenure.
A hallmark of the Rehnquist Court has been
a re-examination of the country's most basic
constitutional arrangements, resulting in
decisions that demanded a new respect for
the sovereignty of the states and placed
corresponding restrictions on the powers of
Congress.
But what had seemed until very recently to
be a legacy in the making now appears
evanescent, perhaps even illusory. Those
who thought they were witnessing a
revolution were last week using very
different words.
"The federalism boomlet has fizzled," said
Michael S. Greve of the American
Enterprise Institute, a conservative research
organization here. Mr. Greve directs the
group's federalism project, dedicated to
"rehabilitating a constitutional federalism."
The outcome of the marijuana case had been
expected. The 2003 decision by a federal
appeals court in San Francisco that Congress
lacked constitutional authority over
marijuana, grown for noncommercial
purposes, that did not cross state lines had
appeared ripe for overruling. A unanimous
reversal in the case, Gonzales v. Raich,
would have signified only that the
combatants in the federalism wars were
waiting for a more fruitful battleground.
But the decision was a hard-fought 6 to 3,
with the chief justice in dissent along with
two of his allies in the federalism cases,
Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Clarence
Thomas. Clearly, the justices had treated
Gonzales v. Raich as a major federalism
battleground, and just as clearly, the chief
justice had lost.
And where were the other two members of
his usual 5-to-4 majority? Justice Anthony
M. Kennedy joined the majority opinion
without explanation. Justice Antonin Scalia
did explain himself, at length, in terms that
gave little comfort to those who viewed the
outcome with dismay.
"A fair-weather federalist," was how Roger
Pilon, director of the libertarian Cato
Institute's Center for Constitutional Studies,
described Justice Scalia. Asked for his
response to the decision, Mr. Pilon
exclaimed: "A disaster."
The full measure of what was at stake, and
what was lost, was provided by Justice
O'Connor's dissenting opinion. It was a cri
de coeur from a justice whose commitment
to the federalism agenda had led her five
years ago to vote with the majority to strike
down a central portion of the Violence
Against Women Act, which authorized
victims of crimes "motivated by gender" to
sue their attackers in federal court.
Intrastate activity that was not essentially
economic was beyond Congress's reach
302
under the Commerce Clause, Chief Justice
Rehnquist wrote for the 5-to-4 majority in
United States v. Morrison.
The marijuana decision, Justice O'Connor
said in her dissent, was "irreconcilable" with
the Violence Against Women Act ruling and
with United States v. Lopez, a 1995 case that
overturned a federal law prohibiting the
possession of guns near schools. The Lopez
case "makes clear that possession is not
itself commercial activity," Justice O'Connor
said, and for the court to now deem the
possession of marijuana within Congress's
authority "threatens to sweep all of
productive human activity into federal
regulatory reach."
It was a complaint the majority barely
deigned to answer. "We need not
determine," Justice John Paul Stevens said in
the majority opinion, whether the cultivation
and use of marijuana for medical purposes,
"taken in the aggregate, substantially affect
interstate commerce in fact, but only
whether a 'rational basis' exists for so
concluding." Clearly it did, he said, adding:
"That the regulation ensnares some purely
intrastate activity is of no moment."
For the 85-year-old Justice Stevens, a
vigorous dissenter from the Rehnquist
federalism decisions, it was a moment to
savor-and not the only recent one. In some
of the most important cases of the past three
terms, on affirmative action, gay rights, the
juvenile death penalty and a federalism
decision a year ago that rejected state
immunity under the Americans With
Disabilities Act for inaccessible
courthouses, he has managed to pull
together and hold a majority.
"Stevens is at the peak of his effectiveness,"
Professor Thomas W. Merrill of Columbia
Law School, a former deputy solicitor
general and close observer of the federalism
cases, said last week. "It is a remarkable
achievement."
Was the federalism revolution ever real and,
if so, what happened to it?
It was a revolution, but a flawed one, in
Professor Merrill's view, "a revolution of
convenience" rather than deep conviction on
the part of all five. "They wanted to make a
difference, to leave a legacy. It was
something that all five could rationalize
themselves into going along with. But once
things started to get on difficult territory, it
started to fall apart."
In a law review article he published two
years ago, entitled "The Making of the
Second Rehnquist Court," Professor Merrill
proposed that among the five, Justice
Scalia's commitment to Rehnquist-style
federalism was the weakest, the product of a
strategic choice by the justice to ally himself
with the four others for the sake of being on
a winning team after concluding that he was
unlikely to make headway with his agenda
on abortion, religion, and other social issues.
Professor Mark V. Tushnet of Georgetown
University Law Center, the author of a new
book, A Court Divided: The Rehnquist
Court and the Future of Constitutional Law,
said that the earlier decisions had "brought
the justices to a threshold that was far away
when Rehnquist joined the court." And
now, he said, "they have to decide whether
to stay where they are, or continue on, or
retreat."
The marijuana case "does not necessarily
mean a retreat," he said. "It was an easy
case, a case at the heart of national
regulatory authority." Professor Tushnet
said a more telling case would be a
challenge to the application of the
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Endangered Species Act to a species without
commercial utility, found only within one
state.
Such a case is on the court's calendar,
awaiting the justices' decision whether to
hear it. The question in GDF Realty
Investments v. Norton is whether Congress
has authority to apply the Endangered
Species Act to require protection of six
species of cave-dwelling insects that live in
caves west of Austin, Tex.
Other cases awaiting action by the court
question federal authority over homemade
machine guns and over the possession of
child pornography. In these two, federal
appeals courts ruled against the government,
citing the authority of the Supreme Court's
Lopez and Morrison decisions. How much
of that authority remains is now the
question.
"The court was never clear about what it
wanted to accomplish or how the revolution
would play itself out when the first modest
steps bumped up against entrenched political
structures," said Mr. Greve of the American
Enterprise Institute.
Like Mr. Greve, other scholars have
wondered whether the court was actually
engaged with anything more than "symbolic
federalism" that did not actually threaten
federal policies that affected many people.
"'The court never reached a stable
equilibrium, and now we are in a period of
very robust national commitments, domestic
as well as foreign." Ultimately he said, "it is
a revolution that has found no takers."
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